Weak states at global climate negotiations
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Weak states at global climate negotiations
（Cambridge elements, . Elements in international relations）
Cambridge University Press, 2020
- : pbk
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Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. [60]-71)
Description and Table of Contents
Description
This Element provides an explanation for the power of weak states in international politics, focusing on the case of international climate negotiations at the United Nations. The author points to the pitfalls of assuming that weak countries elicit power from their coordinated salience for climate issues. Contrastingly, it is argued that weak states' influence at global climate negotiations depends on the moral authority provided by strong states. The author maintains that weak states' authority is contingent on international vulnerability, which intersects broader domestic discussions of global justice, and pushes the leaders of strong countries to concede power to weak countries. New empirical evidence is shown in support of the theory.
Table of Contents
- 1. Introduction
- 2. When do weak states win global climate politics battles and why
- 3. Measuring preferences and success at global climate change conferences
- 4. Empirical evidence from global climate negotiations
- 5. Conclusion.
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