Constraining dictatorship : from personalized rule to institutionalized regimes
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Constraining dictatorship : from personalized rule to institutionalized regimes
(Political economy of institutions and decisions)
Cambridge University Press, 2020
- : pbk
Available at 7 libraries
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-
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies Library (GRIPS Library)
: pbk302.4||Me4801515860
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Library, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization図
: pbkF||321.6||C11952671
Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 239-248) and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
How do some dictatorships become institutionalized ruled-based systems, while others remain heavily personalist? Once implemented, do executive constraints actually play an effective role in promoting autocratic stability? To understand patterns of regime institutionalization, this book studies the emergence of constitutional term limits and succession procedures, as well as elite power-sharing within presidential cabinets. Anne Meng argues that institutions credibly constrain leaders only when they change the underlying distribution of power between leaders and elites by providing elites with access to the state. She also shows that initially weak leaders who institutionalize are less likely to face coup attempts and are able to remain in office for longer periods than weak leaders who do not. Drawing on an original time-series dataset of 46 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1960 to 2010, formal theory, and case studies, this book ultimately illustrates how some dictatorships evolve from personalist strongman rule to institutionalized regimes.
Table of Contents
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Why do leaders institutionalize?
- 3. Two illustrative cases
- 4. How should institutionalization be measured?
- 5. What are the causes of regime institutionalization?
- 6. What are the consequences of institutionalization on autocratic durability?
- 7. What are the consequences of institutionalization on leadership succession?
- 8. Conclusion
- References
- Index.
by "Nielsen BookData"