Britain and the confrontation with Indonesia, 1960-1966

著者

    • Easter, David

書誌事項

Britain and the confrontation with Indonesia, 1960-1966

David Easter

I.B. Tauris, 2012

  • : [pbk]

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注記

Includes bibliographical references (p. [245]-254) and index

"Revised paperback edition published in 2012"--T.p. verso

"First published in hardback by Tauris Academic Studies, ... 2004"--T.p. verso

内容説明・目次

内容説明

The confrontation with Indonesia cut to the heart of Britain's desire to retain global power status in the 1960s and was central to decolonisation and British defence policy across South-East Asia. Factors such as the need to maintain a military base in Singapore drove strategy and this confrontation became a major commitment - close at times to escalating into full-scale regional war. However, 'the Confrontation' was not recorded as a conflict of this scale, and Britain was cast into a passive and defensive role. Here, David Easter reveals a radically different view, persuasively making the case that Britain waged a secret and aggressive war against President Sukarno's Indonesia. It was the covert nature of operations and the deliberate decision of British policy-makers to keep the full extent of this conflict away from public scrutiny that has allowed it to be overshadowed in the annals of history.

目次

Introduction 1 The decision to form Malaysia, 1960-January 1962 2 The Brunei revolt and the start of Confrontation, January 1962-April 1963 3 Pressing ahead with Malaysia, April-September 1963 4 Coping with the Confrontation, September 1963-April 1964 5 Escalation and rethink, May-October 1964 6 Labour and Confrontation, October 1964-March 1965 7 Exit Singapore, April-September 1965 8 The coup attempt in Indonesia, September 1965-January 1966 9 Ending the Confrontation, January-August 1966 Conclusion

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