Rejecting retributivism : free will, punishment, and criminal justice

著者

書誌事項

Rejecting retributivism : free will, punishment, and criminal justice

Gregg D. Caruso

（Law and the cognitive sciences）

Cambridge University Press, 2021

  • : hbk

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注記

Includes bibliographical references (p. 329-383) and index

Summary: "Within the criminal justice system one of the most prominent justifications for legal punishment, both historically and currently, is retributivism. The retributive justification of legal punishment maintains that, absent any excusing conditions, wrongdoers are morally responsible for their actions and deserve to be punished in proportion to their wrongdoing. Unlike theories of punishment that aim at deterrence, rehabilitation, or incapacitation, retributivism grounds punishment in the blameworthiness and desert of offenders. It holds that punishing wrongdoers is intrinsically good. For the retributivist, wrongdoers deserve a punitive response proportional to their wrongdoing, even if their punishment serves no further purpose. This means that the retributivist position is not reducible to consequentialist considerations nor in justifying punishment does it appeal to wider goods such as the safety of society or the moral improvement of those being punished"-- Provided by publisher

収録内容

  • Free will, legal punishment, and retributivism
  • Free will skepticism : hard Incompatibilism and hard luck
  • The epistemic argument against retributivism
  • Additional reasons for rejecting retributivism
  • Consequentialist, educational, and mixed theories of punishment
  • Public health-quarantine model I : a non-retributive approach to criminal behavior
  • Public health-quarantine model II : the social determinants of health & criminal behavior
  • Public health-quarantine model III : human dignity, victims' rights, rehabilitation, and preemptive incapacitation
  • Public health-quarantine model IV : punishment, deterrence, evidentiary standards, and indefinite detention

内容説明・目次

内容説明

Within the criminal justice system, one of the most prominent justifications for legal punishment is retributivism. The retributive justification of legal punishment maintains that wrongdoers are morally responsible for their actions and deserve to be punished in proportion to their wrongdoing. This book argues against retributivism and develops a viable alternative that is both ethically defensible and practical. Introducing six distinct reasons for rejecting retributivism, Gregg D. Caruso contends that it is unclear that agents possess the kind of free will and moral responsibility needed to justify this view of punishment. While a number of alternatives to retributivism exist - including consequentialist deterrence, educational, and communicative theories - they have ethical problems of their own. Moving beyond existing theories, Caruso presents a new non-retributive approach called the public health-quarantine model. In stark contrast to retributivism, the public health-quarantine model provides a more human, holistic, and effective approach to dealing with criminal behavior.

目次

  • Acknowledgments
  • 1. Free will, legal punishment, and retributivism
  • 2. Free will skepticism: hard incompatibilism and hard luck
  • 3. The epistemic argument against retributivism
  • 4. Additional reasons for rejecting retributivism
  • 5. Consequentialist, educational, and mixed theories of punishment
  • 6. Public health-quarantine model I: a non-retributive approach to criminal behavior
  • 7. Public health-quarantine model II: the social determinants of health & criminal behavior
  • 8. Public health-quarantine model iii: human dignity, victims' rights, rehabilitation, and preemptive incapacitation
  • 9. Public health-quarantine model IV: funishment, deterrence, evidentiary standards, and indefinite detention
  • References
  • Index.

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