Rejecting retributivism : free will, punishment, and criminal justice
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Rejecting retributivism : free will, punishment, and criminal justice
（Law and the cognitive sciences / general editors, Bartosz Brożek ... [et al.]）
Cambridge University Press, 2021
- : pbk
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Includes bibliographical references (p. 329-383) and index
Summary: "Within the criminal justice system one of the most prominent justifications for legal punishment, both historically and currently, is retributivism. The retributive justification of legal punishment maintains that, absent any excusing conditions, wrongdoers are morally responsible for their actions and deserve to be punished in proportion to their wrongdoing. Unlike theories of punishment that aim at deterrence, rehabilitation, or incapacitation, retributivism grounds punishment in the blameworthiness and desert of offenders. It holds that punishing wrongdoers is intrinsically good. For the retributivist, wrongdoers deserve a punitive response proportional to their wrongdoing, even if their punishment serves no further purpose. This means that the retributivist position is not reducible to consequentialist considerations nor in justifying punishment does it appeal to wider goods such as the safety of society or the moral improvement of those being punished"-- Provided by publisher