Analyzing electoral promises with game theory
著者
書誌事項
Analyzing electoral promises with game theory
（Routledge focus on economics and finance）
Routledge, 2021
- : hardback
大学図書館所蔵 全4件
注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Electoral promises help to win votes and political candidates, or parties should strategically choose what they can deliver to win an election. Past game-theoretical studies tend to ignore electoral promises and this book sheds illuminating light on the functions and effects of electoral promises on policies or electoral outcomes through game theory models. This book provides a basic framework for game-theoretical analysis of electoral promises.
The book also includes cases to illustrate real life applications of these theories.
目次
1. Electoral Promises in Formal Models 2. Electoral Promises as a Commitment Device 3. Electoral Promises as a Signal 4. Electoral Promises with Vague Words. Bibliography
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