The political economy of the small welfare state in South Korea
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
The political economy of the small welfare state in South Korea
Cambridge University Press, 2019, c2017
- : pbk
Available at 4 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
Note
"First paperback edition 2019"--T.p. verso
Includes bibliographical references and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
This book explains why the Korean welfare state is underdeveloped despite successful industrialization, democratization, a militant labor movement, and a centralized meritocracy. Unlike most social science books on Korea, which tend to focus on its developmental state and rapid economic development, this book deals with social welfare issues and politics during the critical junctures in Korea's history: industrialization in the 1960-70s, the democratization and labor movement in the mid-1980s, globalization and the financial crisis in the 1990s, and the wind of free welfare in the 2010s. It highlights the self-interested activities of Korea's enterprise unionism at variance with those of a more solidaristic industrial unionism in the European welfare states. Korean big business, the chaebol, accommodated the unions' call for higher wages and more corporate welfare, which removed practical incentives for unions to demand social welfare. Korea's single-member-district electoral rules also induce politicians to sell geographically targeted, narrow benefits rather than public welfare for all while presidents are significantly constrained by unpopular tax increase issues. Strong economic bureaucrats acting as veto player also lead Korea to a small welfare state.
Table of Contents
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Theoretical reinterpretation of the small welfare state in South Korea
- 3. The emergence of the small welfare state under the authoritarian developmental state (1961-1987)
- 4. Democratization and limited welfare state development under the conservative rule (1987-1997)
- 5. Economic crisis, power shift, and welfare politics under the Kim Dae Jung government (1997-2002)
- 6. Economic Unionism and the limits of the Korean welfare state under the Roh Moo Hyun government (2003-2007)
- 7. Wind of welfare and tax politics under the returned conservative rule
- 8. Conclusion.
by "Nielsen BookData"