Handbook of game theory and industrial organization

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Bibliographic Information

Handbook of game theory and industrial organization

edited by Luis C. Corchón, Marco A. Marini

Edward Elgar, 2020

  • v. 2 : pbk

Available at  / 4 libraries

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"Paperback edition 2020" -- T.p. verso

Includes bibliographical references and index

Vol. 2: Applications

Description and Table of Contents

Description

Game theory explores situations in which agents interact strategically and provides a useful foundation for studying many traditional industrial organization topics. This approach has also enabled the emergence of new areas of enquiry including law and economics, networks, the digital economy, auctions, experimental game theory and many others. This second volume of the Handbook includes original contributions by experts in the field. It provides up-to-date surveys of the most relevant applications of game theory to industrial organization. The book covers both classical and industrial organization topics such as mergers in markets with homogeneous and differentiated goods, leniency and coordinated effects in cartels and mergers, static and dynamic contests, consumer search and product safety, strategic delegation, platforms and network effects, auctions, environmental and resource economics, intellectual property, healthcare, corruption, experimental industrial organization, and empirical models of research and development. Authoritative and engaging, this unique Handbook will be an indispensable resource for all serious academics, researchers and students of industrial economics and game theory. Contributors incude: S. Anderson, A. Barge-Gil, P. Belleflamme, J. Brandts, R. Burguet, L. Corchon, A. Daughety, N. Fabra, R. Fauli-Oller, J.-J. Ganuza, M.l. Gonzalez Maestre, A. Hernando-Veciana, M. Hoffmann, E. Huergo, M. Kopel, L. Lambertini, A. Lopez, M. Marini, C. Marvao, E. Maskin, J.G. Montalvo, L. Moreno, M. Motta, P. Olivella, M. Peitz, M. Pezzino, M. Polo, J. Potters, J. Reinganum, R. Renault, G. Rota Preziosi, J. Sandonis, M. Serena, G. Spagnolo

Table of Contents

Contents: Foreword by Eric Maskin 1. Introduction Luis C. Corchon and Marco A. Marini PART I COLLUSION AND MERGERS 2. Horizontal mergers in oligopoly Ramon Fauli -Oller and Joel Sandonis 3. Collusive agreements in vertically differentiated markets Marco A. Marini 4. Cartels and leniency: Taking stock of what we learnt Catarina Marvao and Giancarlo Spagnolo 5. Assessing coordinated effects in merger cases Natalia Fabra and Massimo Motta PART II CONTESTS 6. Contest theory Luis C. Corcho n and Marco Serena 7. Endogenous timing in contests Magnus Hoffmann and Gre goire Rota-Graziosi PART III SPECIAL TOPICS 8. Firm pricing with consumer search Simon P. Anderson and Regis Renault 9. Market structure, liability, and product safety Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum 10. Strategic delegation in oligopoly Michael Kopel and Mario Pezzino 11. Platforms and network effects Paul Belleflamme and Martin Peitz 12. Auctions Angel Hernando-Veciana 13. Differential oligopoly games in environmental and resource economics Luca Lambertini 14. Intellectual property Miguel Gonza lez-Maestre 15. Healthcare and health insurance markets Pau Olivella 16. The microeconomics of corruption Roberto Burguet, Juan-Jose Ganuza and Jose G. Montalvo PART IV EXPERIMENTAL AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 17. Experimental industrial organization Jordi Brandts and Jan Potters 18. Empirical models of firms' R&D Andres Barge-Gil, Elena Huergo, Alberto Lo pez and Lourdes Moreno Index

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