Handbook of game theory and industrial organization
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書誌事項
Handbook of game theory and industrial organization
Edward Elgar, 2020
- v. 2 : pbk
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"Paperback edition 2020" -- T.p. verso
Includes bibliographical references and index
Vol. 2: Applications
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Game theory explores situations in which agents interact strategically and provides a useful foundation for studying many traditional industrial organization topics. This approach has also enabled the emergence of new areas of enquiry including law and economics, networks, the digital economy, auctions, experimental game theory and many others.
This second volume of the Handbook includes original contributions by experts in the field. It provides up-to-date surveys of the most relevant applications of game theory to industrial organization. The book covers both classical and industrial organization topics such as mergers in markets with homogeneous and differentiated goods, leniency and coordinated effects in cartels and mergers, static and dynamic contests, consumer search and product safety, strategic delegation, platforms and network effects, auctions, environmental and resource economics, intellectual property, healthcare, corruption, experimental industrial organization, and empirical models of research and development.
Authoritative and engaging, this unique Handbook will be an indispensable resource for all serious academics, researchers and students of industrial economics and game theory.
Contributors incude: S. Anderson, A. Barge-Gil, P. Belleflamme, J. Brandts, R. Burguet, L. Corchon, A. Daughety, N. Fabra, R. Fauli-Oller, J.-J. Ganuza, M.l. Gonzalez Maestre, A. Hernando-Veciana, M. Hoffmann, E. Huergo, M. Kopel, L. Lambertini, A. Lopez, M. Marini, C. Marvao, E. Maskin, J.G. Montalvo, L. Moreno, M. Motta, P. Olivella, M. Peitz, M. Pezzino, M. Polo, J. Potters, J. Reinganum, R. Renault, G. Rota Preziosi, J. Sandonis, M. Serena, G. Spagnolo
目次
Contents:
Foreword by Eric Maskin
1. Introduction
Luis C. Corchon and Marco A. Marini
PART I COLLUSION AND MERGERS
2. Horizontal mergers in oligopoly
Ramon Fauli -Oller and Joel Sandonis
3. Collusive agreements in vertically differentiated markets
Marco A. Marini
4. Cartels and leniency: Taking stock of what we learnt
Catarina Marvao and Giancarlo Spagnolo
5. Assessing coordinated effects in merger cases
Natalia Fabra and Massimo Motta
PART II CONTESTS
6. Contest theory
Luis C. Corcho n and Marco Serena
7. Endogenous timing in contests
Magnus Hoffmann and Gre goire Rota-Graziosi
PART III SPECIAL TOPICS
8. Firm pricing with consumer search
Simon P. Anderson and Regis Renault
9. Market structure, liability, and product safety
Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum
10. Strategic delegation in oligopoly
Michael Kopel and Mario Pezzino
11. Platforms and network effects
Paul Belleflamme and Martin Peitz
12. Auctions
Angel Hernando-Veciana
13. Differential oligopoly games in environmental and resource economics
Luca Lambertini
14. Intellectual property
Miguel Gonza lez-Maestre
15. Healthcare and health insurance markets
Pau Olivella
16. The microeconomics of corruption
Roberto Burguet, Juan-Jose Ganuza and Jose G. Montalvo
PART IV EXPERIMENTAL AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
17. Experimental industrial organization
Jordi Brandts and Jan Potters
18. Empirical models of firms' R&D
Andres Barge-Gil, Elena Huergo, Alberto Lo pez and Lourdes Moreno
Index
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