Prosthesis : with a new preface
著者
書誌事項
Prosthesis : with a new preface
（Posthumanities, 64）
University of Minnesota Press, 2021
- : pbk
- タイトル別名
-
Prosthesis
大学図書館所蔵 件 / 全1件
-
該当する所蔵館はありません
- すべての絞り込み条件を解除する
注記
"Originally published by Stanford University Press, copyright 1995 by the Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University"--T.p. verso
Includes bibliographical references
内容説明・目次
内容説明
An examination of the presumed opposition between the natural human body and artificial inanimate objects
Prosthesis is a landmark work in posthuman thought that analyzes and explores the human body as a technology, seamlessly integrated (both physically and psychologically) with prosthetics. Here David Wills lays the groundwork for ideas he develops in two of his other books, Dorsality, exploring how technology functions behind or before the human, and Inanimation, giving perspective on what it means to be "alive."
In Prosthesis, Wills promotes the idea that the human body is open to supplementation by artificial addenda that operate both internally or externally and engage it in an unceasing arbitration with the environment. Questioning the opposition between animate and inanimate along with the logic of the automatic prioritization of living flesh, Prosthesis undertakes these assumptions by studying thematics of artificiality through the writings of Freud, Derrida, William Gibson, Peter Greenaway, and others. In the twenty-five years since its first publication, Prosthesis has been a point of reference in the field of disability studies. It has also been recognized for its "prosthetic" writing, consisting of academic and autobiographical voices and styles that are artificially attached to one another.
目次
Contents
Acknowledgments
On David Wills and Prosthesis
Jacques Derrida
Preface to 25th Anniversary Edition of Prosthesis
1. Hamilton, 1970
2. Mentone, 1888
3. Africa, 21st Century
4. Berchtesgaden, 1929
5. Paris, 1976
6. Rome, 1985
7. Cambridge, 1553
8. Menton, 1921
9. Geneva, 1978
Notes
Bibliography
「Nielsen BookData」 より
