CiNii 図書 - Corruption and fraud in financial markets : malpractice, misconduct and manipulation

Identifying malpractice and misconduct should be top priority for financial risk managers today Corruption and Fraud in Financial Markets identifies potential issues surrounding all types of fraud, misconduct, price/volume manipulation and other forms of malpractice. Chapters cover detection, prevention and regulation of corruption and fraud within different financial markets. Written by experts at the forefront of finance and risk management, this book details the many practices that bring potentially devastating consequences, including insider trading, bribery, false disclosure, frontrunning, options backdating, and improper execution or broker-agency relationships. Informed but corrupt traders manipulate prices in dark pools run by investment banks, using anonymous deals to move prices in their own favour, extracting value from ordinary investors time and time again. Strategies such as wash, ladder and spoofing trades are rife, even on regulated exchanges - and in unregulated cryptocurrency exchanges one can even see these manipulative quotes happening real-time in the limit order book. More generally, financial market misconduct and fraud affects about 15 percent of publicly listed companies each year and the resulting fines can devastate an organisation's budget and initiate a tailspin from which it may never recover. This book gives you a deeper understanding of all these issues to help prevent you and your company from falling victim to unethical practices. Learn about the different types of corruption and fraud and where they may be hiding in your organisation Identify improper relationships and conflicts of interest before they become a problem Understand the regulations surrounding market misconduct, and how they affect your firm Prevent budget-breaking fines and other potentially catastrophic consequences Since the LIBOR scandal, many major banks have been fined billions of dollars for manipulation of prices, exchange rates and interest rates. Headline cases aside, misconduct and fraud is uncomfortably prevalent in a large number of financial firms; it can exist in a wide variety of forms, with practices in multiple departments, making self-governance complex. Corruption and Fraud in Financial Markets is a comprehensive guide to identifying and stopping potential problems before they reach the level of finable misconduct.

About the Editors xv List of Contributors xvii Foreword xix Acknowledgements xxi Chapter 1: Introduction 1 Carol Alexander and Douglas Cumming Part I What are Manipulation and Fraud and Why Do They Matter? 11 Chapter 2: An Overview of Market Manipulation 13 Talis J. Putnins 2.1 Introduction 14 2.2 Definitions of Market Manipulation 16 2.2.1 Legal Interpretation and Provisions against Market Manipulation 16 2.2.2 Economics and Legal Studies Perspective 18 2.3 A Taxonomy of the Types of Market Manipulation 19 2.3.1 Categories of Market Manipulation 19 2.3.2 Market Manipulation Techniques 22 2.4 Research on Market Manipulation 26 2.4.1 Theoretical Literature 27 2.4.2 Empirical Literature 30 2.4.3 Conclusions from the Research on Market Manipulation 35 2.5 Summary and Conclusions 39 References 40 Chapter 3: A Taxonomy of Financial Market Misconduct 45 Ai Deng and Priyank Gandhi 3.1 Introduction 46 3.2 Challenges in Research on Financial Market Misconduct 50 3.3 Defining Financial Market Misconduct 51 3.3.1 Price Manipulation 53 3.3.2 Circular Trading 54 3.3.3 Collusion and Information Sharing 55 3.3.4 Inside Information 56 3.3.5 Reference Price Influence 56 3.3.6 Improper Order Handling 57 3.3.7 Misleading Customers 58 3.4 Defining Financial Fraud 59 3.4.1 Credit Card Fraud 59 3.4.2 Money Laundering 60 3.4.3 Financial Statement Fraud 60 3.4.4 Computer Intrusion Fraud 61 3.5 Conclusion 61 References 61 Chapter 4: Financial Misconduct and Market-Based Penalties 65 Chelsea Liu and Alfred Yawson 4.1 Introduction 66 4.2 Notable Cases of Financial Reporting Fraud 69 4.3 Financial Reporting Misconduct and Legal Redress 70 4.4 Evolution of US Financial Regulations 71 4.4.1 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (1995) 72 4.4.2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) 72 4.4.3 Dodd-Frank Act (2010) 73 4.5 Legal versus Market-Based Penalties for Financial Misconduct 74 4.5.1 Common Forms of Legal Penalties 74 4.5.2 Role of Market-Based Penalties 75 4.6 Firm-Level Penalties for Corporate Financial Misconduct 75 4.6.1 Direct Economic Costs Captured in Loss of Market Value 83 4.6.2 Loss of Firm Reputation 83 4.6.3 Spillover of Reputational Effect 84 4.6.4 Governance Risk and Insurance Premiums 85 4.6.5 Reduced Liquidity 85 4.6.6 Access to Financing 85 4.6.7 Reduced Innovation 86 4.6.8 Mergers and Acquisitions 86 4.7 Individual-Level Penalties for Corporate Financial Misconduct 87 4.7.1 Executive and Director Turnover 87 4.7.2 Impaired Career Progression 95 4.7.3 Loss of Reputation 96 4.7.4 Executive Compensation 97 4.7.5 Strengthened Monitoring 97 4.8 Causes, Risks, and Moderators of Financial Misconduct 98 4.8.1 Fraud Incentives 98 4.8.2 Risk Factors 113 4.8.3 Public Enforcement: Regulatory and Judicial Stringency 115 4.8.4 Public Enforcement: Detection and Surveillance 116 4.8.5 Private Enforcement 117 4.9 Other Non-Financial Misconduct 118 4.10 Concluding Remarks 119 References 120 Chapter 5: Insider Trading and Market Manipulation 135 Jonathan A. Batten, Igor Loncarski, and Peter G. Szilagyi 5.1 Introduction 135 5.2 Regulatory Framework on Insider Trading and Market Manipulation 140 5.3 Recent Examples of Market Manipulation and Insider Trading 145 5.4 Conclusions 148 References 149 Chapter 6: Financial Fraud and Reputational Capital 153 Jonathan M. Karpoff 6.1 Financial Frauds in the 2000s 154 6.2 The Effects of Fraud Revelation on Firm Value and Reputational Capital 156 6.2.1 Market Value Losses When Financial Misconduct is Revealed 156 6.2.2 Spillover Effects 157 6.2.3 Reputational Losses for Financial Misconduct 158 6.2.4 Direct Measures of Lost Reputational Capital 159 6.2.5 Do Misconduct Firms Always Lose Reputational Capital? 160 6.2.6 Rebuilding Reputational Capital 161 6.3 The Effects of Fraud Revelation on Shareholders and Managers 162 6.3.1 Should Shareholders Pay? Do Managers Pay? 162 6.3.2 Do Shareholders Pay Twice? 162 6.3.3 Are Firm-Level Penalties Efficient? 163 6.3.4 Consequences for Managers and Directors 163 6.4 Why Do Managers Do It? Motives and Constraints 165 6.4.1 Motives for Financial Misconduct 165 6.4.2 Constraints on Financial Misconduct 167 6.5 Proxies and Databases Used to Identify Samples of Financial Statement Misconduct 168 6.6 Conclusion: Reputation, Enforcement, and Culture 170 References 171 Part II How and Where Does Misconduct Occur? 179 Chapter 7: Manipulative and Collusive Practices in FX Markets 181 Alexis Stenfors 7.1 Introduction 181 7.2 Different Types of FX Orders 183 7.3 The Unique FX Market Structure 184 7.4 Examples of Manipulative and Collusive Practices in FX Markets 188 7.4.1 Front Running 188 7.4.2 Triggering Stop-Loss Orders 190 7.4.3 'Banging the Close' 192 7.4.4 Collusion and Sharing of Confidential Information 193 7.4.5 Spoofing 195 7.4.6 Market Abuse via Electronic Trading Platforms 196 7.5 The Reform Process 197 References 199 Chapter 8: Fraud and Manipulation within Cryptocurrency Markets 205 David Twomey and Andrew Mann 8.1 Introduction 206 8.2 Why Do fraud and Manipulation Occur in Cryptocurrency Markets? 212 8.2.1 Lack of Consistent Regulation 212 8.2.2 Relative Anonymity 213 8.2.3 Low Barriers to Entry 214 8.2.4 Exchange Standards and Sophistication 214 8.3 Pump and Dumps 215 8.3.1 Case Studies 217 8.4 Inflated Trading Volume 217 8.4.1 Case Study: January 2017 and PBoC Involvement 219 8.5 Exchange DDoS Attacks 220 8.5.1 Case Study 223 8.6 Hacks and Exploitations 224 8.6.1 Exchange Hacks 224 8.6.2 Smart Contract Exploits 229 8.6.3 Protocol Exploitation 230 8.7 Flash Crashes 230 8.7.1 GDAX-ETH/USD Flash Crash 234 8.8 Order Book-Based Manipulations 235 8.8.1 Quote Stuffing 236 8.8.2 Order Spoofing 237 8.9 Stablecoins and Tether 239 8.9.1 Tether Historical Timeline 240 8.9.2 Tether Controversy and Criticism 242 8.9.3 Tether's Significance in Cryptocurrency Global Markets 245 8.10 Summary and Conclusions 245 References 249 Chapter 9: The Integrity of Closing Prices 251 Ryan J. Davies 9.1 Why Closing Prices Matter 251 9.2 Painting the Tape and Portfolio Pumping 252 9.3 'Bang-the-Close' Manipulation: The Response of Financial Intermediaries 255 9.4 Stock Price Pinning on Option Expiration Dates 259 9.5 Conclusion: Lessons for the Regulation and Design of Financial Markets 263 References 269 Chapter 10: A Trader's Perspective on Market Abuse Regulations 275 Sam Baker 10.1 Introduction 275 10.2 Getting the Trading Edge 278 10.3 A Typical Trader's Market Window 281 10.4 Wash Trades 282 10.5 High Ticking/Low Ticking - Momentum Ignition 284 10.6 Spoofing 286 10.7 Layering 290 10.8 Smoking 292 10.9 Case Study: Paul Rotter a.k.a. 'The Flipper' 295 10.10 The Innocent and the Guilty 299 10.11 What are Exchanges Doing to Prevent Market Abuse? 301 10.11.1 CME Group 301 10.11.2 ICE 302 10.12 What are Trading Companies Doing to Prevent Abuse? 302 10.13 Will There Be an End to Market Abuse? 303 Part III Who are These Scoundrels? 305 Chapter 11: Misconduct in Banking: Governance and the Board of Directors 307 Duc Duy Nguyen, Jens Hagendorff, and Arman Eshraghi 11.1 Introduction 307 11.2 Literature Review 311 11.3 Research Design 312 11.3.1 Data 312 11.3.2 Empirical Design 313 11.3.3 Variables 314 11.4 Empirical Results 316 11.4.1 Main Results 316 11.4.2 Results for Different Classes of Enforcement Actions 320 11.4.3 Does Better Board Quality Alleviate Shareholder Wealth Losses? 323 11.5 Conclusion 323 References 325 Chapter 12: Misconduct and Fraud by Investment Managers 327 Stephen G. Dimmock, Joseph D. Farizo, and William C. Gerken 12.1 Introduction 327 12.2 Related Research 329 12.3 The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and Mandatory Disclosures 331 12.4 Data 332 12.4.1 Investment Fraud 332 12.4.2 Form ADV Data and Variables 337 12.5 Predicting Fraud and Misconduct 340 12.5.1 Predicting Fraud by Investment Managers 340 12.5.2 Interpreting the Predictive Content of the Models 345 12.5.3 K-Fold Cross-Validation Tests 346 12.6 Predicting the Initiation vs. the Continuance of Fraud 347 12.7 Firm-Wide Fraud vs. Fraud by a Rogue Employee 349 12.8 Out-of-Sample Prediction and Model Stability 351 12.9 Policy Implications and Conclusions 352 References 355 Chapter 13: Options Backdating and Shareholders 359 Johan Sulaeman and Gennaro Bernile 13.1 Introduction 359 13.2 Stock Return Patterns around Option Grants 360 13.3 The Backdating Practice 361 13.4 Media Coverage, Restatement, and Investigation 362 13.5 Stock Market Reaction to Public Revelations of Backdating 363 13.6 Investor Reaction to (and Anticipation of) Public Revelations 364 13.7 Other Types of Misbehaviour Related to Option Grants 365 13.7.1 Forward Dating 365 13.7.2 Selective Disclosure 366 13.7.3 Option Exercise Backdating 366 13.7.4 Independent Director Backdating 366 13.8 Connections with Questionable Practices by Corporate Executives and Other Agents 366 13.9 Conclusion 367 References 368 Chapter 14: The Strategic Behaviour of Underwriters in Valuing IPOs 371 Stefano Paleari, Andrea Signori, and Silvio Vismara 14.1 Valuing IPOs 371 14.2 The Underwriter's Incentives in the Valuation of IPOs 373 14.3 Literature Review 374 14.4 Sample, Data, and Methodology 376 14.4.1 Sample and Data 376 14.4.2 Alternative Selection Criteria of Comparable Firms 380 14.4.3 Valuation Bias and IPO Premium 380 14.5 Results 381 14.5.1 Algorithmic Selections 381 14.5.2 Affiliated and Unaffiliated Analysts 386 14.5.3 Underwriters' Selection of Comparable Firms Pre- vs. Post-IPO 390 14.5.4 Pre- vs. Post-IPO Selections and Industry Effects 394 14.6 Conclusions 396 References 397 Chapter 15: Governance of Financial Services Outsourcing: Managing Misconduct and Third-Party Risks 399 Joseph A. McCahery and F. Alexander de Roode 15.1 Introduction 399 15.2 The Four Components in Outsourcing 402 15.2.1 Efficient Outsourcing 402 15.2.2 The Four-Factor Governance Model 404 15.2.3 Misconduct in Outsourcing and the Ability of Financial Institutions to Monitor 407 15.3 The Interaction between Contracting and Monitoring 408 15.3.1 Characterization of Financial Institutions 409 15.3.2 Risks in Outsourcing Services 412 15.4 Governance Mechanisms to Detect Misconduct in Financial Outsourcing 413 15.4.1 Screening and Detection 414 15.5 Conclusion 416 References 417 Part IV Detection and Surveillance of Financial Misconduct 423 Chapter 16: Identifying Security Market Manipulation 425 Mike Aitken, Ann Leduc, and Shan Ji 16.1 Introduction 425 16.2 Background Legislation 427 16.2.1 Australia 427 16.2.2 UK 428 16.2.3 Hong Kong 428 16.2.4 Canada 429 16.2.5 Singapore 430 16.2.6 Malaysia 430 16.2.7 New Zealand 431 16.3 Attributes of Manipulation 431 16.3.1 How Traders Minimize the Resources Needed for Manipulative Trading 432 16.3.2 Difficulties in Determining Whether Trading Behaviour is Manipulative 433 16.3.3 Surveillance Systems 434 16.4 Detection Algorithms 436 16.5 Conclusion 439 Chapter 17: The Analytics of Financial Market Misconduct 441 Ai Deng and Priyank Gandhi 17.1 Introduction 442 17.2 Financial Economic Analysis 446 17.2.1 Benchmarking to Historical or Past Data 447 17.2.2 Benchmarking to Alternate Proxies 451 17.2.3 Benchmarking to a Model 454 17.3 Quantitative Techniques 456 17.3.1 The Principles of Fraud Detection 457 17.3.2 Popular Supervised Learning Techniques for Fraud Detection 458 17.3.3 Popular Unsupervised Learning Techniques for Fraud Detection 460 17.3.4 Dynamic Misconduct Detection 462 17.4 Conclusion 464 References 466 Chapter 18: Benford's Law and Its Application to Detecting Financial Fraud and Manipulation 473 Christina Bannier, Corinna Ewelt-Knauer, Johannes Lips, and Peter Winker 18.1 Introduction 474 18.2 Benford's Law and Generalizations 476 18.2.1 The Basic Principle of Benford's Law 476 18.2.2 Illustration of Benford's Law 477 18.2.3 Testing for Conformity with Benford's Law 478 18.2.4 Considering Further Digits with Benford's Law 480 18.2.5 When Do Data Conform to Benford's Law? 482 18.2.6 Limitations of Using Benford's Law for Identification of Manipulations 483 18.2.7 Generalizations of Benford's Law for Identification of Manipulations 484 18.3 Usage of Benford's Law for Detecting Fraud and Deviant Behaviour 485 18.3.1 Forensic Accounting in the Context of Auditing, Internal Control Systems, and Taxation 486 18.3.2 Finance 487 18.3.3 Surveys and Research 490 18.4 A Case Study: Benford's Law and the LIBOR 491 18.5 Policy Implications 498 18.6 Summary, Limitations, and Outlook 498 References 499 18.A Appendix 504 Part V Regulation and Enforcement 505 Chapter 19: The Enforcement of Financial Market Crimes in Canada and the United Kingdom 507 Anita Indira Anand 19.1 Introduction 507 19.2 Existing Scholarship 508 19.3 Comparative Analysis 512 19.3.1 Canada 512 19.3.2 The United Kingdom 513 19.4 Reform 515 19.4.1 Resource Allocation 515 19.4.2 Principles-Based Regulation 516 19.4.3 Targeted Regulatory Reforms 518 19.5 Conclusion 520 References 520 Chapter 20: A Pyramid or a Labyrinth? Enforcement of Registrant Misconduct Requirements in Canada 527 Mary Condon 20.1 Introduction 527 20.2 Definitional and Institutional Quagmires 529 20.3 The Compliance/Enforcement Continuum 531 20.4 Enforcement Options Available to Sanction Registrant Misconduct 533 20.5 Empirical Information Available about Registrant Misconduct in Canada 535 20.5.1 Criminal Enforcement 535 20.5.2 CSA Non-Criminal Enforcement 536 20.5.3 Director's Decision Data in Ontario 537 20.5.4 SRO Enforcement 538 20.6 Analysis 538 Chapter 21: Judicial Local Protectionism and Home Court Bias in Corporate Litigation 541 Michael Firth, Oliver M. Rui, and Wenfeng Wu 21.1 Introduction 542 21.2 Institutional Background 544 21.2.1 Decentralization and Local Protectionism 544 21.2.2 Judicial Independence 545 21.2.3 The Heterogeneity of the Legal Environment across Regions 548 21.3 Empirical Evidence 548 21.3.1 Sample 549 21.3.2 Basic Statistics 550 21.3.3 The Wealth Effect for Defendants and Plaintiffs around the Filing Announcements at Different Courts 556 21.3.4 The Impact of Court Location on the Wealth Effect 560 21.3.5 Regression Analysis of the Wealth Effects from a Filing Announcement 560 21.3.6 Heckman Two-Step Analysis of Sample Selection Bias 567 21.3.7 The Impact of Court Location on the Likelihood to Appeal 573 21.3.8 Sensitivity Tests 576 21.4 Conclusion 579 References 580 Index 583

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