Democracy, bureaucracy and public choice : economic explanations in political science

書誌事項

Democracy, bureaucracy and public choice : economic explanations in political science

Patrick Dunleavy

Routledge, 2016

  • : hardback

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注記

First published: Prentice Hall, 1991

Includes bibliographical references (p. 260-277) and indexes

内容説明・目次

内容説明

First published in 1991. This book initially offers a critique of some key rational public choice models, to show that they were internally inconsistent and ideologically slanted. Then due to the authors' research the ideas are restructured around a particular kind of institutional public choice method, recognizing the value of instrumental models as a mode of thinking clearly about the manifold complexities of political life.

目次

Introduction: Institutional Public Choice Theory and Political Analysis DEMOCRACY Interest Groups and Collective Action Reconstructing the Theory of Groups Economic Explanations of Voting Behaviour Party Competition - The Preference-Shaping Model BUREAUCRACY Existing Public Choice Models of Bureaucracy The Bureau-Shaping Model Comparing Budget - Maximizing and Bureau-Shaping Models Conclusion - Economic Explanations in Political Science

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詳細情報

  • NII書誌ID(NCID)
    BC06571192
  • ISBN
    • 9781138146631
  • 出版国コード
    uk
  • タイトル言語コード
    eng
  • 本文言語コード
    eng
  • 出版地
    London
  • ページ数/冊数
    xiii, 286 p.
  • 大きさ
    25 cm
  • 分類
  • 件名
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