Handbook of game theory and industrial organization

著者

書誌事項

Handbook of game theory and industrial organization

edited by Luis C. Corchón, Marco A. Marini

Edward Elgar, 2020

  • v. 1 : pbk

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注記

"Paperback edition 2020" -- T.p. verso

Includes bibliographical references and index

Vol. 1: Theory

内容説明・目次

内容説明

Industrial organization studies how markets allocate resources, specifically when there are few agents or when there are frictions that render the price-taking paradigm unsuitable. Game theory explores situations in which agents interact strategically and provides a useful foundation for studying many traditional industrial organization topics. The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main tools of game theory that are used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, and learning and information sharing models. Technical yet accessible, this comprehensive resource will be required reading for both established researchers as well as graduate or advanced undergraduate students in industrial economics and game theory. Contributors incude: R. Amir, A. Attar, G.I. Bischi, F. Bloch, L. Corchon, S. Currarini, C. d'Aspremont, F. Feri, J. Gabszewicz, M. Jensen, L. Julien, F. Lamantia, I. Macho-Stadler, M. Marini, E. Maskin, D. Perez-Castrillo, C. Pimienta, D. Radi, R.A. Ritz, K. Ritzberger, O. Tarola, J. Thisse, A. Urbano, P. Ushchev, X. Vives, J. Zhao

目次

Contents: Foreword by Eric Maskin 1. Introduction Luis C. Corchon and Marco A. Marini PART I BASIC GAMES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 2. Strategic complementarities in oligopoly Xavier Vives 3. On the Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies and the theory of supermodular games Rabah Amir 4. Aggregative games Martin Kaae Jensen 5. Monopolistic competition without apology Jacques-Francois Thisse and Philip Ushchev 6. Oligopoly and product differentiation Jean J. Gabszewicz and Ornella Tarola 7. Oligopolistic competition and welfare Robert A. Ritz PART II DYNAMIC GAMES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 8. Dynamic games Klaus Ritzberger 9. Strategic refinements Carlos Pimienta 10. Stackelberg games Ludovic A. Julien 11. Entry games and free entry equilibria Michele Polo 12. Evolutionary oligopoly games with heterogeneous adaptive players Gian Italo Bischi, Fabio Lamantia and Davide Radi PART III GAMES OF COLLUSION IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 13. Coalitions and networks in oligopolies Francis Bloch 14. TU oligopoly games and industrial cooperation Jingang Zhao PART IV INFORMATION GAMES 15. Trading under asymmetric information: positive and normative implications Andrea Attar and Claude d'Aspremont 16. Moral hazard: Base models and two extensions Ines Macho-Stadler and David Pe rez-Castrillo 17. Learning in markets Amparo Urbano 18. Information sharing in oligopoly Sergio Currarini and Francesco Feri Index

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