From value to rightness : consequentialism, action-guidance, and the perspective-dependence of moral duties
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
From value to rightness : consequentialism, action-guidance, and the perspective-dependence of moral duties
(Routledge studies in ethics and moral theory)
Routledge, 2021
- : hbk
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Note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
This book develops an original version of act-consequentialism. It argues that act-consequentialists should adopt a subjective criterion of rightness.
The book develops new arguments which strongly suggest that, according to the best version of act-consequentialism, the rightness of actions depends on expected rather than actual value. Its findings go beyond the debate about consequentialism and touch on important debates in normative ethics and metaethics. The distinction between criterion of rightness and decision procedures addresses how, why, and in which sense moral theories must be implemented by ordinary persons. The discussion of the rationales of "ought" implies "can" leads to the discovery of a hitherto overlooked moral principle, "ought" implies "evidence", which can be used to show that most prominent moral theories are false. Finally, in the context of discussing cases that are supposed to reveal intuitions that favour either objective or subjective consequentialism, the book argues that which cases are relevant for the discussion of objectivism and subjectivism depends on the type of moral theory we are concerned with (consequentialism, Kantianism, virtue ethics, etc.).
From Value to Rightness will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in normative ethics and metaethics.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Part I. Decision-Guidance
1 The Problem of Decision-Guidance
2 DP and Objective Consequentialism's Travesty of Decision-Guidance
Part II: "Ought" Implies "Can"
3 In Defence of "Ought" Implies "Can"
4 Objective Consequentialism and Ignorance-Induced Inability
5 Four Arguments Against Objective Consequentialism Related to "Ought" Implies "Can"
6 "Ought" Implies "Evidence"
7 Is Subjective Consequentialism Compatible with "Ought" Implies "Can"?
Part III: Intuitions about Perspective-Dependence
8 A New Perspective on the Perspective-Dependence of Moral Duties
9 Objective Consequentialism's Licensing Dilemma
Conclusion
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