The constitutional boundaries of European fiscal federalism
著者
書誌事項
The constitutional boundaries of European fiscal federalism
(Cambridge studies in European law and policy)
Cambridge University Press, 2022
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注記
Bibliography: p. 426-477
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This book bridges the study of European constitutionalism with the study of 'fiscal federalism' - the subfield of public economics concerned with structuring public finances between different levels of government in federal states. On one axis, this book delves into European Union and Member State constitutional law from all EU Member States in order to investigate and identify the existence of permanent constitutional boundaries that will impinge upon the selection of proposed models for EU fiscal federalism. On the second axis, this book engages the study of fiscal federalism in order to determine which institutional configurations known to that field remain legally and economically implementable within those boundaries. It provides a far-reaching investigation of which models of fiscal federalism are compatible with the constitutional boundaries of the European legal order.
目次
- Part I. Methods and Introduction: 1. The Constitutional Boundaries of European Fiscal Federalism
- 2. The Maastricht Architecture of European Fiscal Federalism
- 3. The Failure and Abrogation of the Maastricht Model
- 4. Constitutional Criteria for EU Fiscal Federalism
- Part II. Maastricht Architecture of European Fiscal Federalism: 5. The Emergent Centralised Architecture of European Fiscal Federalism
- 6. The Constitutional Boundaries of Economic and Monetary Union
- 7. The Constitutional Boundaries of Member State Fiscal Sovereignty
- 8. Principles of Fiscal Federalism for the European Union
- Conclusion: Proposed Directions for Future Research and Reform
- Bibliography
- Index.
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