Rational choice using imprecise probabilities and utilities
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Rational choice using imprecise probabilities and utilities
（Cambridge elements, . Elements in decision theory and philosophy / edited by Martin Peterson）
Cambridge University Press, 2021
- : pbk
Available at / 3 libraries
-
No Libraries matched.
- Remove all filters.
Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. [69]-72)
Description and Table of Contents
Description
An agent often does not have precise probabilities or utilities to guide resolution of a decision problem. I advance a principle of rationality for making decisions in such cases. To begin, I represent the doxastic and conative state of an agent with a set of pairs of a probability assignment and a utility assignment. Then I support a decision principle that allows any act that maximizes expected utility according to some pair of assignments in the set. Assuming that computation of an option's expected utility uses comprehensive possible outcomes that include the option's risk, no consideration supports a stricter requirement.
Table of Contents
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Imprecision
- 3. Rational imprecision
- 4. Probabilism
- 5. The expected-utility principle
- 6. Norms for imprecise attitudes
- 7. The permissive principle of choice
- 8. Sequences of choices
- 9. Choices in games of strategy
- 10. Conclusion.
by "Nielsen BookData"
