Kant, Wittgenstein, and the performativity of thought
著者
書誌事項
Kant, Wittgenstein, and the performativity of thought
Palgrave Macmillan, c2021
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注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This book explores the idea that there is a certain performativity of thought connecting Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. On this view, we make judgments and use propositions because we presuppose that our thinking is about something, and that our propositions have sense. Kant's requirement of an a priori connection between intuitions and concepts is akin to Wittgenstein's idea of the general propositional form as sharing a form with the world.
Aloisia Moser argues that Kant speaks about acts of the mind, not about static categories. Furthermore, she elucidates the Tractatus' logical form as a projection method that turns into a so-called 'zero method', whereby propositions are merely the scaffolding of the world. In so doing, Moser connects Kantian reflective judgment to Wittgensteinian rule-following. She thereby presents an account of performativity centering neither on theories nor methods, but on the application enacting them in the first place.
目次
1. Introduction: Kant's Acts of the Mind and Wittgenstein's Projection MethodPart I Kant and the "I Think" as the Facticity of Thought2. A Connection Between Thought and Thing A Priori.3. Judging as Connecting Thought and Thing4. Synthesis and Bringing the Manifold of Intuition into an ImagePart II Wittgenstein's Picture Theory as a Method of Projection5. The Form of the Proposition6. Projection Method7. Logic Degree ZeroPart III Kant's Schematizing and Wittgenstein's Picturing or Projecting as Performativity8. Kant, Synthesis, and Schema9. Wittgenstein, Meaning, and Use10. Performativity and the Act of Thinking11. Conclusion
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