On informal institutions and accounting behavior

著者

• Du, Xingqiang

書誌事項

On informal institutions and accounting behavior

Xingqiang Du

（Contributions to finance and accounting）

Springer, c2021

注記

Includes bibliographical references

内容説明・目次

内容説明

This book focuses on the Chinese context to investigate how informal institutions (Confucian culture and its dimensions, religion, political connections) in China affect accounting behaviors. This book tries to show that cultural influence and religious impacts in China are not trivial and increasingly important, and specifically, informal institutions have its bright and dark sides with regard to its effects on accounting behaviors. This book aims to investigate whether and how informal institutions (Confucian culture and its dimensions, religion, political connections) affect micro-level accounting behaviors, including but not limited to audit quality, financial misstatement, R&D, corporate misconducts, corporate philanthropy and corporate environmental responsibility. This book provides graduate students, scholars and practitioners in the fields of accounting, business administration and religion with an in-depth understanding about how informal institutions as a set of social norms affect micro-level accounting behaviors. First, this book is the first to focus on the Chinese context and investigate the effects of informal institutions on accounting behavior. Second, this book documents systematic evidence to show the bright and dark sides with regard to the relation between informal institutions and accounting behavior in China. Lastly, this book reveals informal institutions can serve as an important mechanism to affect accounting behaviors.

目次

1 Informal Institution and Accounting: Introduction and Outline1.1 The Aim of this Book1.2 Core Concepts1.2.1 Accounting Behavior1.2.2 Formal Institutions and Informal Institutions1.3 The Coexistence between Formal and Informal Institutions: A Diagram1.4 The Relation between Formal Institutions and Informal Institutions1.5 Layout and Content of This Book1.6 The Potential Theoretical Contributions1.7 Extended Readings1.8 ConclusionReference2 Auditor-CEO Surname Sharing and Financial Misstatement2.1 Introduction2.2 Institutional Background, Literature Review, and Hypotheses Development2.2.1 Surname and Its Influence in Contemporary China2.2.2 The Chinese Audit Market and Auditor Independence2.2.3 Literature Review2.2.4Auditor-CEO Surname Sharing and Financial Misstatement2.2.5 Rare Surname versus Common Surname2.3 Research Design2.3.1Empirical Model Specification for Hypothesis 12.3.2 Empirical Model Specification for Hypothesis 22.3.3 Sample2.3.4 Data Source2.4 Results2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics2.4.2 Pearson Correlation Analysis2.4.3 Regression Results of Hypothesis 12.4.4 Regression Results of Hypothesis 252.4.5 Robustness Checks Using the Number of Signing Auditors Sharing the Same Surname with theCEO2.4.6 Robustness Checks Using Other Measures of Financial Misstatement2.4.7 Robustness Checks Using the Expanded Samples2.5 Endogeneity and Additional Tests2.5.1 Time-Series Tests Using an Exogenous Regulatory Event2.5.2 Subsample Tests Using an Exogenous Regulatory Event2.5.3 Additional Tests Using both Time and Individual Effects under an Exogenous Regulatory Event2.5.4 Endogeneity Tests Using the Propensity Score Matching Approach2.5.5 The Effects of Auditor-CEO Surname Sharing on MAO and Abnormal Audit Fees2.5.6 Cross-Sectional Analysis Considering Institutional Environment2.5.7 Additional Tests Considering Auditor-CEO Hometown Relationship and School Ties2.5.8 Additional Tests Based on the Integrated Variables Combining Surname Sharing and HometownRelationship2.6 Conclusion, Managerial Implications, and LimitationsReference3 CEO-Director Surname Connectedness and Corporate Misconduct3.1 Introduction3.2 Institutional Background, Literature Review, Hypotheses Development3.2.1 Surname in the Chinese Context3.2.2 Prior Literature on Surname Distribution and Surname Connectedness3.2.3 Prior Literature on Corporate Misconduct3.2.4 The Influence of CEO-Director Surname Connectedness on Corporate Misconduct3.2.5 The Moderating Effect of the popularity of the CEO's surname3.3 Research Design3.3.1 Empirical Model Specification for H13.3.2 Empirical Model Specification for H23.3.3 Research Sample Identification3.3.4 Data Source3.4 Empirical Findings3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics3.4.2 Pearson Correlation Analysis63.4.3Multivariate Test of H1 and H2 (Main Findings)3.4.4 Robustness Checks Using the Ratio of CEO-Director Surname Connectedness3.4.5Robustness Checks Using the Number of Corporate Misconduct3.5 Endogeneity and Additional Tests3.5.1 Endogeneity Tests Using the Propensity Score Matching Approach3.5.2 Additional Tests3.6 Conclusions, Managerial Implications, and LimitationsReference4 CEO-Auditor Hometown Complex and Pre-IPO Earnings Management4.1 Introduction4.2 Institutional Background, Literature Review, and Hypotheses Development4.2.1 Hometown Complex in China4.2.2 Literature Review4.2.3 Hometown Complex and Pre-IPO Earnings Management (Hypothesis 1)4.2.4 The Moderating Effect of Non-Hometown-Worked CEO-Auditor Combination (Hypothesis 2)4.3 Research Design4.3.1 Empirical Model Specification for Hypothesis 14.3.2 Empirical Model Specification for Hypothesis 24.3.3 Hometown Complex between the CEO and the Signing Auditors4.3.4 Pre-IPO Earnings Management4.3.5 Sample4.3.6 Data Source4.4 Empirical Results4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics4.4.2 Pearson Correlation Analysis4.4.3 Regression Results of Hypothesis 14.4.4 Regression Results of Hypothesis 24.4.5 Robustness Checks Using Other Measures of CEO-Auditor Hometown Complex4.4.6 Robustness Checks Using Other Measures of Pre-IPO Discretionary Accruals4.5 The Endogeneity Discussions and Additional Tests4.5.1 The Endogeneity Tests Using the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) Approach4.5.2 The Endogeneity Tests Using the Traditionally Matched Sample74.5.3 Additional Tests Using Yearly pre-IPO Discretionary Accruals4.6 Conclusions, Managerial Implications, and Limitations4.6.1 Managerial Implications4.6.2 Limitations and Future ResearchReference5 Does Honorific Usage in Audit Reports Signal the Impairment of Auditor Independence? Evidence fromChinese Special Treatment Firms5.1 Introduction5.2 Institutional Background, Literature Review, and Hypotheses Development5.2.1 China's Special Treatment Regulations5.2.2 Honorifics and Real Names in Audit Reports5.2.3 Literature Review5.2.4 The Effect of Honorific Usage in Audit Reports of Chinese ST Firms and Audit Independence(Hypotheses 1and 2)5.2.5 The Asymmetric Impacts between Habitual and Discretionary Honorifics on AuditorIndependence (Hypotheses 3 and 4)5.3 Research Design5.3.1 Model Specification for H15.3.2 Model Specification for H25.3.3 Model Specification for H35.3.4 Model Specification for H45.3.5 Identification of Sample5.3.6 Data Source5.4 Empirical Results5.4.1 Descriptive Statistics and t/z Tests5.4.2 Pearson Correlation Analysis5.4.3 Multivariate Tests of H1 and H25.4.4 Multivariate Tests of H3 and H45.4.5 Robustness Checks Using the Degree of Listing Status Improvement5.4.6 Robustness Checks Using Other Measures of Audit Quality5.4.7 Endogeneity Tests Using the Propensity Score Matching Approach5.5 Conclusion8Reference6 Religious Entrepreneurs and Corporate R&D Investment6.1 Introduction6.2 Institutional Background, Theory, and Hypotheses Development6.2.1 Religion and Religious Belief in Contemporary China6.2.2 A Framework about the Impacts of Entrepreneur-Specific Characteristics on Corporate Decisions6.2.3 The Inhibiting Effect of an Entrepreneur's Religious Belief on Risk-Taking6.2.4 The Competitive Influence of Different Religious Beliefs on R&D Investment6.2.5 The Moderating Effect of Political Connections on the Relation between Religious Belief andR&D6.3 Methodology6.3.1 Research Setting6.3.2 Data6.3.3 Sample6.3.4 R&D (Dependent variable)6.3.5 Religious Belief (Independent Variable)6.3.6 Political Connections (Moderating Variable)6.3.7 Control Variables6.4 Results6.4.1 Descriptive Statistics, Univariate Tests, and Pearson Correlation Analysis6.4.2 Main Findings6.4.3 Robustness Checks using Alternative Measures of R&D Investment6.4.4 The Endogeneity Issue between Religious Belief and R&D6.4.5 Additional Tests of the Association between Religion Belief and R&D Considering Firm Size6.4.6 Additional Tests with the Distinction between Start-ups and Non-Start-Ups6.5 Discussion6.5.1 Theoretical Contributions6.5.2 Managerial Implications6.5.3 Limitations and Future Directions6.6 ConclusionReference7 Religion and Corporate Diversification: The Case of Tourism Industry97.1 Introduction7.2 Literature Review, Institutional Background and Hypotheses Development7.2.1 Literature Review on Corporate Diversification7.2.2 Literature Review on Religion and Tourism7.2.3 Institutional Background7.2.4 Religion and Corporate Diversification into Tourism Industry (H1)7.2.5 The Moderating Role of Internal Control (H2)7.3 Empirical Model and the Measures of religion7.3.1 Empirical Model Specification for H17.3.2 Empirical Model Specification for H27.3.3 Geographic-Proximity-Based Religion Variables and Their Rationale7.4 Sample, Descriptive Statistics, and Empirical Results7.4.1 Sample7.4.2 Data Sources7.4.3 Descriptive Statistics7.4.4 Pearson Correlation Analysis7.4.5 Multivariate Test of H17.5 Robustness Checks7.5.1 Robustness Checks Using Different Religion variables7.5.2 Robustness Checks Using the Likelihood of Corporate Diversification into Tourism Industry7.5.3 Using the Two-Stage OLS-Tobit Regression Procedure to Control for the Endogeneity7.5.4 Using Different Samples to Control for the Potential Endogeneity7.6 Discussion7.6.1 Theoretical Contributions7.6.2 Managerial Implications7.6.3 Limitation and Future Research7.7 ConclusionsReference8 Auditor-Client Religiosity Convergence and Financial Misstatement8.1 Introduction8.2 Institutional Background, Literature Review, and Hypotheses Development8.2.1 The Increasingly Religious Influence in Contemporary Chinese Society108.2.2 Auditor Independence in the Chinese Audit Market8.2.3 Literature Review8.2.4 The Effect of Auditor-Client Religiosity Convergence on Financial Misstatement in China8.3 Research Design8.3.1 The Measure of Auditor-Client Religiosity Convergence8.3.2 Discussions on the Rationality of Auditor-Client Religiosity Convergence8.3.3 Baseline Model Specification for H18.3.4 Model Specification for H28.3.5 Sample8.3.6 Data Sources8.4 Empirical Results8.4.1 Descriptive Statistics8.4.2 Pearson Correlation Analysis8.4.3 Multivariate Test of H18.4.4 The Incremental Explanatory Power of Auditor-Client Religiosity Convergence8.4.5 Multivariate Test of H28.4.6 Robustness Checks Using Alternative Measures of Financial Misstatement8.4.7 Robustness Checks Using Alternative Measures of Auditor-Client Religiosity Convergence8.5. Endogeneity and Additional Tests8.5.1 Endogeneity Tests Using the Change Model Approach8.5.2 Endogeneity Tests Using a Quasi-Natural Experiment Setting of Urban Redevelopment inChinese Metropolitan Cities8.5.3 Endogeneity Tests Using the Instrumental Variable (IV) Two-Stage OLS-Logistic Regression8.5.4 Additional Tests Including Auditor-Client Geographic Proximity and Audit Firm Fixed Effects8.5.5 Additional Tests of H1 and H2 after Distinguishing Buddhism from Taoism8.5.6 Additional Tests Excluding Firms in Ethnic Minority Autonomous Regions8.6 ConclusionsReference9 Political Connections, Law Enforcement, and Corporate Environmental Performance9.1 Introduction9.2 Institutional Background, Literature Review, and Hypotheses Development9.2.1 Literature Review119.2.2 Environmental Conservation and Political Embeddedness in Chinese Family Firms9.2.3 Hypotheses Development9.3 Model Specifications and Variables9.3.1 Multivariate Test Model for Hypothesis 19.3.2 Multivariate Test Model for Hypothesis 29.3.3 Corporate Environmental Performance9.3.4 Political Connections9.4 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics9.4.1 Sample Selection9.4.2 Data Source9.4.3 Descriptive Statistics9.4.4 Pearson Correlation Analysis9.5 Empirical Results9.5.1 Multivariate Tests of Hypothesis 19.5.2 Multivariate Tests of Hypothesis 29.6 Robustness Checks9.6.1 Robustness Checks Using the Rank of Political Connections9.6.2 Robustness Checks Using Alternative Dependent Variables9.7 Discussion on the Potential Endogeneity between Political Connections and CEP9.8 Discussions9.8.1 Theoretical Contributions9.8.2 Managerial Implications9.8.3 Limitations and Future Research9.9 ConclusionReference10 The Preference of Signing Auditors toward Spicy Cuisine and Financial Reporting Quality10.1 Introduction10.2 Background, Literature Review, and Hypotheses Development10.2.1 Diversified Cuisines in China10.2.2 Literature on Food (Cuisine) Preference and Personality10.2.3 Financial Reporting Quality and Auditor Independence in the Chinese Stock Market10.2.4 The Preference of Signing Auditor toward Spicy Cuisines and Financial Reporting Quality1210.2.5 The Moderating Effect of Ownership Nature10.3 Research Design10.3.1 Sample10.3.2 Data Source10.3.3 Financial Reporting Quality (Discretionary Accruals)10.3.4 The Spicy Index of Signing Auditors10.3.5 Model Specification for Hypothesis 110.3.6 Model Specification for Hypothesis 210.4 Results10.4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Analysis10.4.2 Regression Results of Hypothesis 110.4.3 Regression Results of Hypothesis 210.4.4 Robustness Checks of Hypotheses 1 and 2 Using Other Measures of Spicy Indexes10.4.5 Robustness Checks of Hypotheses 1 and 2 Using Other Measures of Discretionary Accruals10.5 Endogeneity and Additional Tests10.5.1 Endogeneity Tests10.5.2 Additional Tests Using the Reduced Sample Only Including Signing Auditors Born Before197810.5.3 Additional Tests Considering Economic Development in Native Places of Signing Auditors10.5.4 Other Additional Tests10.6 Conclusions, Managerial Implications, Limitations, and Future DirectionsReference11 One Thorn of Experience, Corruption Atmosphere, and Corporate Philanthropy11.1 Introduction11.2 Literature Review, Theory, and Hypotheses Development11.2.1 The Cultural Revolution and Its Influence on the Chinese Society11.2.2 Literature Review11.2.3 The Cultural Revolution Experiences of Directors and Corporate Philanthropy11.2.4 The Moderating Effect of Provincial Corruption Atmosphere11.3 Methodology11.3.1 Sample11.3.2 Data1311.3.3 Corporate Philanthropy (Dependent Variable)11.3.4 The Cultural Revolution Experiences of Directors (Independent Variable)11.3.5 Provincial Corruption Atmosphere (Moderating Variable)11.3.6 Control Variables11.4 Results11.4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Analysis11.4.2 Main Findings11.4.3 Robustness Checks Using Alternative Measures of Corporate Philanthropy11.4.4 Robustness Checks Using Alternative Measures of the Cultural Revolution Experiences ofDirectors11.4.5 The Endogeneity Issue11.4.6 Additional Tests Excluding the Influence of Other Big Events in China11.5 Discussions11.5.1 Theoretical Contributions11.5.2 Managerial Implications11.5.3 Limitations and Future Research11.6 ConclusionsReference12 Conclusions, Managerial Implication, and Future Directions12.1 Main Conclusions12.2 Managerial Implications12.3 Limitations and Future DirectionsReference

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詳細情報

• NII書誌ID(NCID): BC10450737
• ISBN:
  • 9789813344617
• 出版国コード: si
• タイトル言語コード: eng
• 本文言語コード: eng
• 出版地: Singapore
• ページ数/冊数: xviii, 495 p.
• 大きさ: 25 cm
• 件名:
  • LCSH : Macroeconomics
• 親書誌ID:
  • BC09658435