Legal conventionalism
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Legal conventionalism
(Law and philosophy library, v. 126)
Springer, c2019
Available at 1 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
Note
Includes bibliographical references
Description and Table of Contents
Description
The concept of convention has been used in different fields and from different perspectives to account for important social phenomena, and the legal sphere is no exception. Rather, reflection on whether the legal phenomenon is based on a convention and, if so, what kind of convention is involved, has become a recurring issue in contemporary legal theory. In this book, some of the foremost specialists in the field make significant contributions to this debate. In the first part, the concept of convention is analysed. The second part reflects on whether the rule of recognition postulated by Hart can be understood as a convention and discusses its potential and limitations in order to explain the institutional and normative character of law. Lastly, the third part critically examines the relations between conventionalism and legal interpretation. Given the content and quality of the contributions, the book is of interest to those wanting to understand the current state of the art in legal conventionalism as well as those wanting to deepen their knowledge about these questions.
Table of Contents
Part 1 The Notion of Convention.- Pre-conventions. A Fragment of the Background.- Re-examining Deep Conventions: Practical Reason and Forward-Looking Agency.- Part II Conventions and The Rule of Recognition.- Conventions, Reasons, and the Law.- The Rule of Recognition as a Constitutive Convention.- Social Facts and Law: Why is the Rule of Recognition a Convention?.- Cooperative Conventions, Rule of Recognition and Institutional Practices.- On Identifying the Law and Its Supposed Conventional Foundations. A Set-Theory Approach.- Part III Conventions and Legal Interpretation.- Conventionalism Unchained and Sceptical. A Defence of a Quasi-Realist Account of Legal Statements Against Dworkin's Criticisms.- Conventionalism and the Causal Theory of Reference.- The Interpretation of Plans.
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