Force, content and the unity of the proposition

Author(s)

• Mras, Gabriele M.
• Schmitz, Michael

Bibliographic Information

Force, content and the unity of the proposition

edited by Gabriele M. Mras, Michael Schmitz

（Routledge studies in contemporary philosophy）

Routledge, 2022 [i.e. 2021]

• : hbk

Note

Includes bibliographical references and index

Summary: "This volume advances discussions between critics and defenders of the force-content distinction and opens new ways of thinking about force and speech acts in relation to the unity problem. The force-content dichotomy has shaped the philosophy of language and mind since the time of Frege and Russell. Isn't it obvious that, for example, the clauses of a conditional are not asserted and must therefore be something forceless only asserted through a proposition? Recently some philosophers have begun questioning this line of argument. How can a proposition be a unified truth-value bearer rather than just a mere list of words? They argue that the forceful act of a subject takes a position about how things are. The essays in this book address a variety of positions related to this lively debate. Force, Content, and the Unity of the Proposition will be of interest to researchers working in philosophy of language, philosophical logic, philosophy of mind, and linguistics"-- Provided by publisher

Description and Table of Contents

Description

This volume advances discussion between critics and defenders of the force-content distinction and opens up new ways of thinking about force and speech acts in relation to the unity problem. The force-content dichotomy has shaped the philosophy of language and mind since the time of Frege and Russell. Isn't it obvious that, for example, the clauses of a conditional are not asserted and must therefore be propositions and propositions the forceless contents of forceful acts? But, others have recently asked in response, how can a proposition be a truth value bearer if it is not unified through the forceful act of a subject that takes a position regarding how things are? Can we not instead think of propositions as being inherently forceful, but of force as being cancelled in certain contexts? And what do assertoric, but also directive and interrogative force indicators mean? Force, Content and the Unity of the Proposition will be of interest to researchers working in philosophy of language, philosophical logic, philosophy of mind and linguistics.

Table of Contents

Introduction Michael Schmitz and Gabriele M. Mras Part I: Force and Unity 1. Force and Content Charles Travis 2. Force, Mood and the Unity of the Proposition Maria van der Schaar 3. Concept, Truth and the Unity of the Proposition Gabriele M. Mras 4. Force, Content and the Varieties of Unity Michael Schmitz Part II: Force and Cancellation 5. The Varieties of Cancellation Peter Hanks 6. Entertaining as Simulation Francois Recanati 7. Force Cancellation and Force Liberation Eleni Manolakaki Part III: Force, Content, Truth and Satisfaction 8. Global Expressivism and the Puzzle of Truth-Apt Sentences Stephen Barker 9. Preliminaries for a Speech-Act Theory of Imperative Content Christopher Hom and Jeremy Schwartz 10. Force, Content and Translucent Self-Ascriptions Mitch Green 11. On a Neglected Fregean Motive for Distinguishing Between Content and Force Mark Textor 12. Truthmaking, Satisfaction and the Force-Content Distinction Friederike Moltmann

by "Nielsen BookData"

Details

• NCID: BC12532162
• ISBN:
  • 9780367561130
• LCCN: 2021038433
• Country Code: us
• Title Language Code: eng
• Text Language Code: eng
• Place of Publication: New York
• Pages/Volumes: ix, 256 p.
• Size: 24 cm
• Classification:
  • LCC : BC181
  • DC23 : 160
• Subject Headings:
  • LCSH : Proposition (Logic)
  • LCSH : Conditionals (Logic)
  • LCSH : Language and logic
  • LCSH : Speech acts (Linguistics)
  • LCSH : Language and languages -- Philosophy
• Parent Bibliography ID:
  • BA62130982