Carnap, Quine, and Putnam on methods of inquiry
著者
書誌事項
Carnap, Quine, and Putnam on methods of inquiry
Cambridge University Press, 2018, c2017
- : pbk
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注記
First published in hardback, 2017
Includes bibliographical references (p. 261-272) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Carnap, Quine, and Putnam held that in our pursuit of truth we can do no better than to start in the middle, relying on already-established beliefs and inferences and applying our best methods for re-evaluating particular beliefs and inferences and arriving at new ones. In this collection of essays, Gary Ebbs interprets these thinkers' methodological views in the light of their own philosophical commitments, and in the process refutes some widespread misunderstandings of their views, reveals the real strengths of their arguments, and exposes a number of problems that they face. To solve these problems, in many of the essays Ebbs also develops new philosophical approaches, including new theories of logical truth, language use, reference and truth, truth by convention, realism, trans-theoretical terms, agreement and disagreement, radical belief revision, and contextually a priori statements. His essays will be valuable for a wide range of readers in analytic philosophy.
目次
- Part I. Carnap: 1. Carnap's logical syntax
- 2. Carnap on ontology
- Part II. Carnap and Quine: 3. Carnap and Quine on truth by convention
- 4. Quine's naturalistic explication of Carnap's logic of science
- Part III. Quine: 5. Quine gets the last word
- 6. Reading Quine's claim that definitional abbreviations create synonymies
- 7. Can logical truth be defined in purely extensional terms?
- 8. Reading Quine's claim that no statement is immune to revision
- Part IV. Quine and Putnam: 9. Conditionalization and conceptual change: Chalmers in defense of a dogma
- 10. Truth and trans-theoretical terms
- Part V. Putnam: 11. Putnam and the contextually apriori.
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