The Federal Reserve : a new history

著者

書誌事項

The Federal Reserve : a new history

Robert L. Hetzel

University of Chicago Press, 2022

  • : cloth

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注記

Includes bibliographical references (p. 641-669) and index

内容説明・目次

内容説明

An illuminating history of the Fed from its founding through the tumult of 2020. In The Federal Reserve: A New History, Robert L. Hetzel draws on more than forty years of experience as an economist in the central bank to trace the influences of the Fed on the American economy. Comparing periods in which the Fed stabilized the economy to those when it did the opposite, Hetzel tells the story of a century-long pursuit of monetary rules capable of providing for economic stability. Recast through this lens and enriched with archival materials, Hetzel's sweeping history offers a new understanding of the bank's watershed moments since 1913. This includes critical accounts of the Great Depression, the Great Inflation, and the Great Recession-including how these disastrous events could have been avoided. A critical volume for a critical moment in financial history, The Federal Reserve is an expert, sweeping account that promises to recast our understanding of the central bank in its second century.

目次

List of Figures and Tables Chapter 1. In Search of the Monetary Standard Chapter 2. The Organization of the Book Chapter 3. What Causes the Monetary Disorder That Produces Real Disorder? Appendix: Tables of the Monetary Contraction Marker by Recession Chapter 4. The Creation of the Fed 4.1. Populist Opposition to a Central Bank 4.2. Reform of the National Banking System and the National Monetary Commission 4.3. The Real Bills Foundation of the Early Fed 4.4. A Gold Standard Mentality in a Regime of Fiat Money Creation 4.5. Concluding Comment Chapter 5. Why the Fed Failed in the Depression: The 1920s Antecedents 5.1. The Real Bills Ethos of the 1920s 5.2. Stopping Speculation without the Discipline of Real Bills and the International Gold Standard 5.3. The Controversy over Stabilizing the Price Level 5.4. Regulating the Flow of Credit: The "Tenth Annual Report" 5.5. Controversy over the Monetary Standard: The Eastern Establishment versus the Populists 5.6. Concluding Comment Chapter 6. A Fiat Money Standard: Free Reserves Operating Procedures and Gold 6.1. Changing the Monetary Standard with No Understanding of the Consequences 6.2. The Fed's Primitive Free Reserves Procedures 6.3. Reserves Adjustment and the Call Loan Market 6.4. The Pragmatic Development of the New Procedures 6.5. Gold Convertibility and Free Gold: Frozen into a Gold Standard Mentality 6.6. The Fed's Incomprehension of the Consequences of Its Operating Procedures 6.7. Concluding Comment Chapter 7. A Narrative Account of the 1920s 7.1. (Mis)Understanding a Paper Money Standard 7.2. Benjamin Strong 7.3. Adolph Miller-the Nemesis of Benjamin Strong 7.4. The 1920-21 Recession 7.5. Free Gold 7.6. Monetary Policy in Recession: 1923-24 and 1926-27 7.7. 1927 7.8. Eliminating Credit Diversion into Securities Speculation 7.9. Were the 1920s the "High Tide" of Federal Reserve Monetary Policy? 7.10. Concluding Comment Chapter 8. Attacking Speculative Mania 8.1. Liquidating Speculative Credit by Liquidating Total Credit 8.2. New York: Raise the Discount Rate and Banks Will Cut Back on Speculative Loans 8.3. The Board: Use "Direct Pressure" to Make Banks Cut Back on Speculative Loans 8.4. Marching toward the Great Depression 8.5. A Graphical Overview of the Transmission of Contractionary Monetary Policy 8.6. Identifying the Cause of the Depression as Contractionary Monetary Policy 8.7. Concluding Comment Chapter 9. The Great Contraction: 1929-33 9.1. An Overview of the Great Contraction 9.2. The Great Contraction and Unrelievedly Contractionary Monetary Policy 9.3. 1930: Why Did the Fed Back Off before Recovery Began? 9.4. Guarding against a Revival of Speculation by Keeping Banks in the Discount Window 9.5. 1931: Contractionary Monetary Policy Becomes Even More Contractionary 9.6. The Gold Standard Transmitted Contractionary US Monetary Policy 9.7. 1932: Open Market Purchases and What Might Have Been 9.8. 1932: Why Did the Fed Back Off? 9.9. Early 1933: The Collapse of the Banking System 9.10. What Made the Great Contraction So Deep and So Long? 9.11. Why Did Learning Prove Impossible? 9.12. Concluding Comment Chapter 10. The Roosevelt Era 10.1. Another Monetary Experiment 10.2. Ending Gold Convertibility in 1933: Setting Off and Killing the Boom 10.3. Return to a Gold Peg 10.4. Governor Marriner Eccles 10.5. The 1936-37 Recession 10.6. Keeping the Real Bills Faith 10.7. Concluding Comment Chapter 11. The Guiding Role of Governor Harrison and the NY Fed 11.1. Was Policy "Inept" Because Leadership Shifted Away from New York? 11.2. The Origin of the "New York View" 11.3. Assessing the Friedman-Schwartz View That Power Shifted from New York to the Board 11.4. 1930 11.5. 1931 11.6. 1932 11.7. The Political Economy of Open Market Purchases in 1932 11.8. 1933 11.9. The 1936-37 Increases in Required Reserves 11.10. Concluding Comment Chapter 12. Contemporary Critics in the Depression 12.1. H. Parker Willis 12.2. John Henry Williams 12.3. Charles O. Hardy 12.4. Joseph A. Schumpeter 12.5. Gottfried Haberler 12.6. Carl Snyder 12.7. Harold Reed 12.8. Lionel D. Edie 12.9. John R. Commons 12.10. Gustav Cassel 12.11. Ralph Hawtrey 12.12. T. Alan Goldsborough 12.13. Irving Fisher 12.14. Lauchlin Currie Chapter 13. From World War II to the 1953 Recession 13.1. The Post-Accord Grand Experiment 13.2. From the End of the War to the Accord 13.3. Explaining Recession with Prewar Inflationary Expectations 13.4. From Real Bills to Lean-against-the-Wind: The Crisis Leading to the Accord 13.5. What Did the Fed Borrow from and What Did It Abandon of Its 1920s Monetary Policy? Chapter 14. LAW (Lean-against-the-Wind) and Long and Variable Lags 14.1. Lean-against-the-Wind (LAW) 14.2. LAW with Trade-Offs and Long and Variable Lags 14.3. LAW with Credibility or LAW with Trade-Offs? 14.4. LAW with Credibility and LAW with Trade-Offs as Semicontrolled Experiments 14.5. Concluding Comments Chapter 15. The Early Martin Fed 15.1. The End of Real Bills 15.2. Free Reserves as the Intermediate Target and Bills Only 15.3. Concluding Comment Chapter 16. From Price Stability to Inflation 16.1. Back-to-Back Recessions: 1957Q3 to 1958Q2 and 1960Q2 to 1961Q1 16.2. How Did the Early Martin Fed Lose Its Way in the Second Half of the 1960s? 16.3. Martin's Ill-Fated Bargain Chapter 17. The Burns Fed 17.1. The Political and Intellectual Environment 17.2. Burns's View of the Business Cycle and Economic Stabilization 17.3. Burns as FOMC Chairman 17.4. Inflation as a Cost-Push Phenomenon 17.5. "Macroeconometric Failure on a Grand Scale" 17.6. Concluding Comment Chapter 18. Stop-Go and the Collapse of a Stable Nominal Anchor 18.1 The Complicated Politics of an Incomes Policy and Stop-Go Monetary Policy 18.2. Lean-against-the-Wind with Trade-Offs or Stop-Go Monetary Policy: A Taxonomy 18.3. Burns's Juggling Act 18.4. G. William Miller 18.5. The Cost of Allowing Inflation to Emerge in Economic Recovery 18.6. Concluding Comment Appendix: Real Rate of Interest Chapter 19. The Volcker Fed and the Birth of a New Monetary Standard 19.1. Restoring a Stable Nominal Anchor 19.2. Creating a New Monetary Standard: LAW with Credibility 19.3. The Louvre Accord 19.4. A Graphical Overview of Monetary Policy in the Great Moderation 19.5. A New Monetary Standard Chapter 20. The Greenspan FOMC 20.1. Restoring a Stable Nominal Anchor 20.2. A Rocky Start with Louvre and the 1987 Stock Market Crash 20.3. The 1990 Recession, the Jobless Recovery, an Inflation Scare, and Finally Credibility 20.4. The Asia Crisis and the 2000 Recession 20.5. Balancing Price Stability with Cost-Push Pressures 20.6. Fear of Deflation 20.7. Did Expansionary Monetary Policy Cause a Housing Bubble? Chapter 21. The Great Recession 21.1. An Overview: This Time Was Not Different from Past Recessions 21.2. A Chronology of the Great Recession 21.3. Fall 2008, the Lehman Bankruptcy, and the Flight of the Cash Investors 21.4. Monetary Policy Takes a Back Seat 21.5. Bernanke and the Credit Channel 21.6. Reviving Real Bills Theories of the Collapse of Speculative Excess 21.7. Contractionary Monetary Policy Chapter 22. The 2008 Financial Crisis 22.1. The Financial Safety Net and Moral Hazard 22.2. The Cash Investors Run the SIVs in Summer 2007 22.3. From Bear Stearns to Lehman Brothers 22.4. After Lehman 22.5. Putting Out the Fires in Fall 2008 22.6. Bank Bailouts 22.7. The Political Economy of Credit Policy 22.8. Credit Policy Crowded Out Monetary Policy 22.9. Crossing the Rubicon to Allocating Credit 22.10. The Great Financial Crisis and Erosion of Support for Free Markets Chapter 23. The Eurozone Crisis 23.1. A Narrative Account of the Great Recession in the Eurozone 23.2. The Interaction of Financial Crisis and Contractionary Monetary Policy 23.3. The Quantitative Impact of a Monetary Shock 23.4. Concluding Comment Chapter 24. Recovery from the Great Recession 24.1. Monetary Policy Was Initially Moderately Contractionary in the Recovery 24.2. A Slow Start to the Recovery and Preemptive Increases in the Funds Rate 24.3. Secular Stagnation, Fear of Global Recession, and Central Banks Out of Ammunition 24.4. Quantitative Easing 24.5. What Accounts for the Near Price Stability in the Recovery from the Great Recession? 24.6. Concluding Comment Appendix: The FOMC's QE Programs Chapter 25. Covid-19 and the Fed's Credit Policy 25.1. Chair Powell Defines the Narrative 25.2. What Destabilized Financial Markets in March 2020? 25.3. What Calmed Financial Markets in March 2020? 25.4. Credit Policy Does Not Draw Forth Real Resources 25.5. Supporting Financial Markets While Avoiding Credit Allocation 25.6. Can the Fed Maintain Its Independence? 25.7. Concluding Comment Appendix: Program Definitions Appendix: The Political Economy of Credit Policy Chapter 26. Covid-19 and the Fed's Monetary Policy: Flexible-Average-Inflation Targeting 26.1. FOMC Commentary 26.2. An Evolving Phillips Curve Sidelines Inflation 26.3. The Return of the Phillips Curve 26.4. Monetary Policy Becomes Expansionary Chapter 27. How Can the Fed Control Inflation? 27.1. Is Monetizing Government Debt by the Fed Inflationary? 27.2. The Control of Money Creation and Inflation with IOR (Interest on Reserves) 27.3. Restoring Money as an Indicator 27.4. Concluding Comment Chapter 28. Making the Monetary Standard Explicit 28.1. Why the FOMC Communicates the Way It Does 28.2. Rules versus Discretion as Seen by a Fed Insider 28.3. A Case Study in FOMC Decision-Making: The August 2011 Meeting 28.4. Using the SEP to Move toward Rule-Based Policy 28.5. Using a Model to Explain the Monetary Standard 28.6. Rules, Independence, and Accountability Chapter 29. What Is the Optimal Monetary Standard? 29.1. From Monetarism to the "Basic" New Keynesian DSGE Model 29.2. The NK Model 29.3. LAW with Credibility and LAW with Trade-Offs (Cyclical Inertia) 29.4. The Optimal Rule 29.5. Money and the NK Model 29.6. Concluding Comment Chapter 30. Why Is Learning So Hard? Acknowledgments Bibliography Index

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