Delivering on promises : the domestic politics of compliance in international courts
著者
書誌事項
Delivering on promises : the domestic politics of compliance in international courts
（Chicago series on international and domestic institutions / edited by William Howell and Jon Pevehouse）
The University of Chicago Press, 2022
- : paper
- タイトル別名
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Domestic politics of compliance in international courts
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注記
Content Type: text (rdacontent), Media Type: unmediated (rdamedia), Carrier Type: volume (rdacarrier)
Includes bibliographical references (p. [313]-337) and index
Summary: "When do international institutions effectively promote economic cooperation among countries and help them resolve conflict? Despite their formal independence from international authority, states have created rules of behavior, particularly governing international economic relations, and international tribunals that are empowered to enforce them. Just how effective are these institutions? In Delivering on Promises Lauren Peritz demonstrates that these international courts do indeed deliver results-but they are only effective under certain conditions. States are more likely to fail to comply with international rules and decisions when domestic industries have the political ability to effectively oppose compliance in particular cases. The author evaluates her argument with an extensive empirical analysis tracing the domestic politics of compliance with the decisions of two international economic courts, the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, and the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) which foc
収録内容
- International adjudication, stakeholders, and domestic divisions
- A theory of international courts, compliance, and domestic veto players
- The design and operation of two international courts
- Policy compliance in WTO disputes
- Trade cooperation in WTO disputes
- The ECJ and domestic constraints on the single market
- Reshaping international economic courts
