Delivering on promises : the domestic politics of compliance in international courts

著者

書誌事項

Delivering on promises : the domestic politics of compliance in international courts

Lauren J. Peritz

（Chicago series on international and domestic institutions / edited by William Howell and Jon Pevehouse）

The University of Chicago Press, 2022

  • : paper

タイトル別名

Domestic politics of compliance in international courts

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注記

Content Type: text (rdacontent), Media Type: unmediated (rdamedia), Carrier Type: volume (rdacarrier)

Includes bibliographical references (p. [313]-337) and index

Summary: "When do international institutions effectively promote economic cooperation among countries and help them resolve conflict? Despite their formal independence from international authority, states have created rules of behavior, particularly governing international economic relations, and international tribunals that are empowered to enforce them. Just how effective are these institutions? In Delivering on Promises Lauren Peritz demonstrates that these international courts do indeed deliver results-but they are only effective under certain conditions. States are more likely to fail to comply with international rules and decisions when domestic industries have the political ability to effectively oppose compliance in particular cases. The author evaluates her argument with an extensive empirical analysis tracing the domestic politics of compliance with the decisions of two international economic courts, the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, and the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) which foc

収録内容

  • International adjudication, stakeholders, and domestic divisions
  • A theory of international courts, compliance, and domestic veto players
  • The design and operation of two international courts
  • Policy compliance in WTO disputes
  • Trade cooperation in WTO disputes
  • The ECJ and domestic constraints on the single market
  • Reshaping international economic courts

内容説明・目次

内容説明

A timely investigation into the conditions that make international agreements-and the institutions that enforce them-vulnerable. When do international institutions effectively promote economic cooperation among countries and help them resolve conflict? Although the international system lacks any central governing authority, states have created rules, particularly around international economic relations, and empowered international tribunals to enforce those rules. Just how successful are these institutions? In Delivering on Promises Lauren J. Peritz demonstrates that these international courts do indeed deliver results-but they are only effective under certain conditions. As Peritz shows, states are less likely to comply with international rules and international court decisions when domestic industries have the political ability to obstruct compliance in particular cases. The author evaluates the argument with an extensive empirical analysis that traces the domestic politics of compliance with the decisions of two international economic courts: the World Trade Organization's dispute settlement mechanism and the Court of Justice of the European Union. At a time when international agreements are under attack, this book sheds light on the complex relationship between domestic politics and international economic cooperation, offering detailed evidence that international economic courts are effective at promoting interstate cooperation.

目次

Chapter 1 International Adjudication, Stakeholders, and Domestic Divisions Chapter 2 A Theory of International Courts, Compliance, and Domestic Veto Players Chapter 3 The Design and Operation of Two International Courts Chapter 4 Policy Compliance in WTO Disputes Chapter 5 Trade Cooperation in WTO Disputes Chapter 6 The ECJ and Domestic Constraints on the Single Market Chapter 7 Reshaping International Economic Courts Acknowledgments A1 Appendix for Chapter 4 A2 Appendix for Chapter 5 A3 Appendix for Chapter 6 Notes References Index

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