The dictator's dilemma at the ballot box : electoral manipulation, economic maneuvering, and political order in autocracies
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
The dictator's dilemma at the ballot box : electoral manipulation, economic maneuvering, and political order in autocracies
（Weiser center for emerging democracies）
University of Michigan Press, 2022
- : paper
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Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 301-324) and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Modern dictatorships hold elections. Contrary to our stereotypical views of autocratic politics, dictators often introduce elections with limited manipulation wherein they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud and pro-regime electoral institutions. Why do such electoral reforms happen in autocracies? Do these elections destabilize autocratic rule? The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box explores how dictators design elections and what consequences those elections have on political order. It argues that strong autocrats who can effectively garner popular support through extensive economic distribution become less dependent on coercive electioneering strategies. When autocrats fail to design elections properly, elections backfire in the form of coups, protests, and the opposition's stunning election victories. The book's theoretical implications are tested on a battery of cross-national analyses with newly collected data on autocratic elections and in-depth comparative case studies of the two Central Asian republics-Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The book's findings suggest that indicators of free and fair elections in dictatorships may not be enough to achieve full-fledged democratization.
Table of Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
List of Abbreviations
Note on Translation and Transliteration
Preface
Acknowledgements
Part I: Puzzles and Arguments
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: A Theory of Autocratic Elections
Part II: Cross-National Explorations
Chapter 3: Blatant Electoral Fraud
Chapter 4: Institutional Manipulation
Chapter 5: Economic Maneuvering
Chapter 6: Backfiring at the Ballot Box
Part III: Comparative Case Studies
Chapter 7: From Electoral Manipulation to Economic Maneuvering: Nazarbaev's Kazakhstan
Chapter 8: From Electoral Manipulation to Autocratic Breakdown: Akaev's Kyrgyzstan
Chapter 9: Conclusion
References
Appendix
by "Nielsen BookData"
