Debating equal pay for all : economy, practicability and ethics
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書誌事項
Debating equal pay for all : economy, practicability and ethics
（Palgrave debates in business and management / series editor, Anders Örtenblad）
Palgrave Macmillan, c2021
- : pbk
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Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This anthology debates the idea of giving all people - no matter which profession or position they have (and whether they have a job or not) - the same pay. Some contributors argue against equal pay for all, some for increased pay equality but not for total pay equality, and some argue for equal pay for all. There is no common conclusion in the book; instead, the book aims to encourage reflection as well as further debate on something that is often taken for granted, namely differentiated pay, by offering a set of various standpoints in the debate, backed-up with various kinds of arguments. Among bases for arguments that are put forward in the book, economy, practicability and ethics belong to the most frequently occurring ones. This book is the first one to be published in the book series Palgrave Debates in Business and Management.
目次
- Preface by Anders OErtenblad 1. Background and introduction: Why debating equal pay for all? Anders OErtenblad SECTION A. AGAINST EQUAL PAY (This section contains chapters that argue that "equal pay for all" is a bad idea.) 2. The thermodynamic nature of life as the premise of the theory of fair remuneration Mieczyslaw Dobija The human body is powered by thermal engines. We know it and feel it, but theoretical explanations come from Sir Kelvin and P. Atkins. The first scholar formulated the second law of thermodynamics, according to which a heat engine cannot operate without a cooler
- the cooler does not have to be a special device, but simply an environment that fulfills the role of a heat consumer. P. Atkins reminded us that the human body contains thousands of biochemical reactions acting on the principle of a thermal engine, so while living we must lose some of the energy transferred by the heat to the environment. As P. Atkins [2005, pp. 157-158] explains, the human organism can be perceived as a thermal engine
- "... The abstract thermal engine found in our body is diffused between all the cells of our body and takes thousands of different forms ..." The author explains the action of the thermal engine in the body via the ATP molecule (adesin-triphosphate), which converts into adenosine diphosphate thanks to the enzymes, while releasing energy. Therefore, according to the first law of thermodynamics, lost energy must be replenished. Without supplementation, the human ability to do the work would disappear over time. These extremely important interpretations show the thermodynamic complexity of human body processes. The essence of an honest wage results from the observation that if life requires the operation of thermal engines, and these can work only if part of the source energy is lost, then this loss must be balanced to maintain balance and preserve the existence of being. A fair salary must, therefore, balance the natural loss of human capital resulting from the essence of life. This loss is determined by the random variable s, whose average value is, according to the study, equal to E(s) = 0.08 [1 / year]. This also includes the knowledge that Nature creates the potential for capital growth determined by the constant p = E (s), but in nature the dispersion of power is also spontaneous, so growth can be lost if it is not prevented by work. This constant defines the potential average growth rate of capital in economics and it serves also as the fundamental for computation of the employee's human capital value. The fair pay (W) of an employee is determined as 8 percent of his/her human capital [H (p,T)], where T is number of years of work experience. Thus, the fair minimum pay is determined as follows: W(p) = p x H(p,T). What can be equal in compensation is this 8% applied to each employee human capital. The second factor usually differs among workers so pays are often different as well. Pays should be consistent with strong theory and good practice. Therefore the idea "equal pay for all" cannot gain a support. Atkins P., (2005), "Palec Galileusza. Dziesiec wielkich idei nauki", Dom Wydawniczy Rebis, Poznan. [Galileeo's Finger - The Ten Great Ideas of Science, (2003)] 3. Against Equal Pay Matt Zwolinski There is no good economic or moral rationale for the idea of "equal pay for all." In terms of economics, such a proposal would destroy the incentive-producing and information-conveying role of prices in the labor market, leading to catastrophic misallocations of labor and dire consequences for human welfare. And morally, there is simply no good rationale for either (a) the idea that all persons ought to have an equal income, or that (b) that it would be the responsibility of employers to provide it. A more morally and economically sensible idea is the proposal that government provide people with an equal minimum income. Such an income would provide a safety net below which no one would be allowed to fall, but above which they would be permitted (and incentivized) to climb through their own efforts. An equal minimum income would guarantee sufficiency without guaranteeing equality, and would do so in a way that avoids the distorting effects on the labor market entailed in the proposal for equal pay. 4. Different lives, different expectations, different pay levels. Thibault Perrin 178,721 migrants put their life in danger crossing the Mediterranean Sea for a decent life in Europe (Millman, 2018). They provide their workforce in exchange for at least, a minimum wage to cover basic functional needs they could not regularly cover in their home country. When arriving in Europe one could wonder if they are not surprised to meet with Europeans having different expectations. Indeed, most European countries have now been able to generate such a wide middle-class covering basic functional needs expectations that is now turning itself to materialistic needs (Kasser, Ryan, Zax, & Sameroff, 1995). Modern societies seem to be structured on materialistic values built by marketing specialists who massively used behavioural research to influence future consumers crafting a need that people did not have on the first place. These values are now fully integrated by people who may camp for days next to an Apple shop to purchase the last I phone. How come are people committed to a point that they would camp on the streets to buy a product? Because these corporations managed to build a strong brand equity conducting to materialistic values (Goldberg, Gorn, Peracchio, & Bamossy, 2003). Brand equity theorist Keller (1993) underlined that consumers choose a product based on their brand perception on three dimensions: functional, emotional and psychosocial. Apple is associated with highly reliable phones, technological affection and social status. These additional needs drive some people to buy even more making pay an important aspect in their lives. Therefore, while some people expect a job providing them task significance, pay seem for many of greater importance. Consequently taking into account these higher pay expectations one may observe distortions within a workplace experiencing idiosyncratic pay deals, deals negotiated between an employee and its own manager (Rousseau, Ho, & Greenberg, 2006) rather than organisation pay guidelines. A good illustration of this situation is reflected in some self-managed cooperatives fixing themselves their own level of remuneration. In France, a worker cooperative called Scop-ti decided collectively all employees should be paid from 1 600 euros for an operator to 2 000 euros net salary for those with more responsibilities (Wattez, 2018). In this situation it took months of hard negotiations to explain why someone with a master's degree would have the same level of compensation as someone with a high school diploma. And it seems hard to maintain external equity with external candidates that may have significantly higher pay expectations. Consequently, I maintain it is not possible to have an equal pay for all. Goldberg, M. E., Gorn, G. J., Peracchio, L. A., & Bamossy, G. (2003). Understanding materialism among youth. Journal of consumer psychology, 13(3), 278-288. Kasser, T., Ryan, R. M., Zax, M., & Sameroff, A. J. (1995). The relations of maternal and social environments to late adolescents' materialistic and prosocial values. Developmental Psychology, 31(6), 907-914. doi:10.1037/0012-1649.31.6.907 Keller, K. L. (1993). Conceptualizing, measuring, and managing customer-based brand equity. Journal of marketing, 57(1), 1-22. Millman, J. (2018). Mediterranean Migrant Arrivals Reach 15,289 in 2018
- Deaths Reach 517. Retrieved from https://www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-reach-15289-2018-deaths-reach-517 Rousseau, D. M., Ho, V. T., & Greenberg, J. (2006). I-deals: Idiosyncratic terms in employment relationships. Academy of Management Review, 31(4), 977-994. Wattez, E. (2018). Fralib : les ouvriers decouvrent qu'etre patron, c'est pas si facile ! Capital. 5. Deserving Without Luck: A desert-based case for unequal pay Huub Brouwer and Willem van der Deijl When asked whether some people deserve more than others, Milton Friedman responded: 'I think desert is an impossible thing to decide. Who deserves what? Nobody deserves anything!'[1] To defend his skepticism about desert, Friedman points out that how hard people work, and how large of a productive contribution they make, is a matter of luck: Some people are born into caring and stable families, others are not. Some people are born in good health, others are not. These differences in luck are so omnipresent, according to him, that they undermine the desert-based case for unequal pay. In this chapter, we will argue that Friedman's luck challenge to desert can be resisted. Desert can, in fact, justify unequal pay. In particular, it seems to us that compensatory desert can justify unequal pay. We defend this main claim in three steps. First, we point out that some jobs are more demanding and onerous than others. We then argue that people can differentially deserve income on the basis of how demanding an onerous their jobs are. And, thirdly, we explain that this compensatory notion of desert is not vulnerable to Friedman's luck challenge. 6. Equal Pay for All: An Idea Whose Time Has Not, and Will Not, Come Thomas Mulligan The proposal on offer is a radical form of universal basic income. Not only does each eligible citizen receive, unconditionally, a fixed income, he receives only that income. This is a bad idea for two reasons. First, it is inefficient. By deviating from the equal pay proposal, we can make some citizens better-off without making anyone worse-off. I illustrate this inefficiency with a toy model. Second, the proposal would be regarded as unjust by almost everyone. A survey of the empirical work on justice makes this plain. Equal pay for equal work is desirable
- equal pay no matter what is something else entirely. It is an idea not likely to find adherents. 7. Unequal pay, really? How we are fooled by subjective opinions and novice interpretations of salary data Frode Eika Sandnes Simple salary descriptive statistics are often used as arguments for compensating against salary inequalities, especially in contexts of appraisals. This chapter argue for unequal pay and looks at such common statistics and interpretation practices and show that arguments often are based on misleading interpretations of the salary data. Established statistical testing appropriate tools for identifying inequalities are discussed as more neutral mechanisms. Mechanisms for different type of salary representations and their implications are also discussed. 8. Equal pay for all and income inequality Wiemer Salverda Irrespective of the productive consequences that the introduction of fully equal (hourly) pay for any job may have, its potential effects on the distribution of incomes warrant close scrutiny in their own right. Fairness in society counts as much as fairness in the work place. In the bygone world of the single breadwinner with a full-time job the resulting equality of annual earnings (if we abstract from job entry or exit during the year) would have implied an equally flat distribution of household incomes - extending, in due course, to the old-age pensions based on such earnings. However, in spite of growing individualization, present-day society is characterized by a dominance of households comprising two or more wage earners: in Europe three quarters of employees share a household with at least one other employee. This combination of earnings together with the concomitant rise of part-time employment, which challenges the exclusive position of full-time employment, uproots that simple equalization of incomes. Instead, the distribution of working time over individuals and their households has established itself as another essential dimension of labour-market inequality - characterized also by a strengthening gradient of educational attainment. Fully equal hourly pay will mean little if not combined with equal hours, and even if hours were equalized their combination in households would continue to generate an unequal distribution of incomes. I will briefly substantiate these issues empirically for EU member states. Consequently, I reject the idea of introducing equal pay for all. The two corollaries, equal incomes and equal hours, are so significant that they triplicate the incredibly tall order that introducing equal pay in itself already is. Instead I'd advocate a coherent reduction in inequalities in all three domains. SECTION B. IN BETWEEN FOR AND AGAINST EQUAL PAY (This section contains chapters that argue in between "for" and "against" "equal pay for all". It may be that these chapters further on will be divided into two sections, one section on "IN BETWEEN, LEANING TOWARDS AGAINST" and another section on "IN BETWEEN, LEANING TOWARDS FOR") 9. A 'middle way' between 'equality' and 'the market': A pay ratio Peter Dorey I would like to present the case for a 'middle way' between 'equality and 'the market'
- a pay ratio, whereby highest salaries should not exceed a multiple (to be specified) of the lowest in a firm or industry. This would still allow those with skills or responsibility to be rewarded, but would prevent the gross disparities and inequalities we currently have in the UK (those at the top paid about 165 x more than the lowest paid). It would also permit bosses to pay themselves more if a firm is successful - but they would need to offer a corresponding pay rise too. 10. How fair is equal pay? Duncan Brown and Peter Reilly The aim of the chapter is to consider the proposition that there should be pay equality for all in the context of the management of people (employees/contractors etc.) at their workplace. The chapter will review the advantages/benefits, disadvantages/challenges for employers and employees of this idea with a focus on its impact on organisational effectiveness. Despite the fact that organisational leaders might reject the idea of total pay equality out of hand, in fact there are arguments in its favour, especially facilitating the deployment of people, enabling change and encouraging teamwork and innovation. There are also types of organisation (co-operatives) and sectors (charity) where it might make more sense than in commercial businesses where the preferred culture is collaborative rather than competitive. But there are obvious objections in not acknowledging the differences in what people bring to work (knowledge, skills and experience), the responsibilities they take on at work, the conditions under which they work or the lack of incentive to be effective at work. There are also sectors (financial services) and occupations (sales) where removing differentials might lead to loss of productivity/performance, particularly where the link between individual effort and performance is very obvious. The Cuban economy is hardly the best advertisement for a flat rate common national wage, and the government has recently announced the introduction of bonuses. It might therefore make more sense to look at reducing pay inequalities rather than removing them. Or aim to make only part of the reward package (base pay) largely equal but vary other remuneration with performance as under profit sharing or gainsharing/team based pay plans. 11. Compensation is (not) a question of money Anja H. Olafsen, Jacques Forest and Anais Thibault Landry An average of 76.3% of people would continue to work even though they don't need the money (Paulsen, 2008), people greatly overestimate the impact of income on life satisfaction (Aknin, Norton & Dunn, 2009) and money is more or less only good to reduce daily sadness but not increase daily happiness (Kushlev, Dunn, & Lucas, 2015). Knowing this, we wonder why companies spend so much time, energy, resources, and money (!) on compensation strategies as it seems to be a negligible motivating factor at work (although it can be a demotivating factor if it is not fair). Moreover, data collected in representative samples of 164 countries on earth (Jebb, Tay, Diener & Oishi, 2018) show evidence that there is such a thing as enough money, what the authors term a satiation point. Does this mean that we should pay everybody the same amount? It appears that there is a universal desire for equitable (not egalitarian) pay, at least on data from over 50 000 people in 40 countries (Kiatpongsan & Norton, 2014). There is a tolerable differentiation between the lowest salaries and the top earners, be it in a company, government or country, inasmuch as the multiplicative factor is not higher than 5 times (e.g., if the lowest salary is 24 000$, the top-earner should not receive more than 120 000$). If differentiation is too high, it leads to inequity or, in other words, unjustified differences. When inequity is too high, it leads to lower performance (Bloom, 1999, 2002) and higher levels of violent crimes, substance abuse, mental health problems, bullying, pollution, obesity, unwanted teen pregnancies, imprisonment, as well as lower levels of social trust and mobility, creativity, eco-friendly behaviors, children health, social mobility, literacy and life expectancy. Using the most recent literature on Self-Determination Theory, compensation and the different meanings of money, the purpose of this book chapter will be to argue that: Money is a tool and that it should be used wisely There is such a thing as enough money Too much unjustified differences between salaries is never good Bonus and/or salary and/or money in general can have different meanings It is the meaning and the use of money (not the amount we get per se) that can increase or decrease optimal functioning Those different meanings of money are not immutable, and effective interventions can act on them 12. Equal living conditions for all and equal income distribution Rosa Garcia-Hernandez Remuneration schemes can be analyzed from different perspectives. On the one hand, from employees features point of view, wages could be a result of their personal worth in terms of skills, abilities, education and training. From employers perspective wages are considered as a labor cost and through compensation-based motivational strategies as a possible influence on employees attitudes and employee productivity, in order to improve competitiveness level. From neoclassical competitive model of labor market, wages are determined by worker productivity level. So, because nof everybody has the same features and the same level of productivity and motivation not everybody could earn the same compensation. But, on the other hand, from Industrial Relations approach wage determination and wage equality will depend on collective bargaining but not on competitive market. Trade unions and employer organizations, have to be taken into account. And from economic policies perspective, wages are important for the demand of the economy and the influence in improvement of income distribution is an important issue. So, behind these last approaches there is a searching of some level of equality in wages. Comparing data from different countries, the objective of this chapter is to show that wages, as a source of income, must be an amount of money to cover minimum living conditions, without inequalities or discriminations (racial or gender). So, everybody has to earn an equal wage in that minimum level or an equal income, because today working is not a guarantee that minimum living standard are covered (in work poverty). From that minimum level, some differences in wages could appear in terms of different level of responsibility or risk for example or different level of firm or industry productivity (more than individual productivity). But it is important not to get a big wage range in order to keep an equal income distribution, which is our last purpose. 13. Basic Needs, Fair Wages, and Inequality Kory P. Schaff In this paper, I consider the question whether wage inequality is morally permissible and, by extension, how much inequality should be permitted. Markets in labor determine wages by supply and demand, skills, and social capital. The total value of these wages is typically divided into two parts: the "compensatory" and "contributory." The former is compensation for the value that workers add with the performance of their skills, while the latter provides an offset to costs they incur from such performance. For this reason, highly skilled workers are well compensated because their performance enhances value, and since the acquisition of skills entails education and longer hours developing them, the contributory part of their wages tends to be greater as a result. By contrast, less skilled workers supposedly add less value from their performance and have less social capital to offer, which justifies lower wages in terms of both composition and contribution. From the moral point of view, however, all persons have an equal worth that obligates others to respect and fulfill their morally relevant interests. These interests include things such as subsistence, security, self-respect, and community. The argument of this paper focuses only on subsistence, or having basic needs satisfied, including clean water, nutrition, housing and health care. Since no person can survive or flourish without having these needs minimally satisfied, all persons have a relevant interest in ensuring these needs are fulfilled. I argue that wage inequality can be justified so long as the fulfillment of basic needs is met by at least one part of the total value of wages, either compensatory or contributory. Less skilled workers that allegedly add less value, nevertheless still incur significant costs working in part-time or unskilled jobs such as alienation, financial hardship, and poor health. Since highly skilled workers are well paid on both compensatory and contributory grounds, less-skilled workers should be paid sufficiently to satisfy their basic needs on the contributory ground that they incur such costs, or so I shall argue. 14. Closing the Gap - The Benefits of Lowering Pay Ratios Bhavya Mohan Having the exact same compensation for all people, particularly in a market-driven capitalistic society, is an unrealistic goal that would be nearly impossible to achieve in the near term. However, this chapter argues that such societies would benefit from actively working to lessen the gap between those who are paid the most and those who are paid the least. There are many metrics used to measure inequity in income, but this chapter will focus on one measure of much policy interest around the world- CEO-to-worker pay ratios - and current initiatives to bring these gaps closer to parity. First, the chapter will discuss how the rise in executive pay compared with that of the average worker has directly contributed to increased income inequality (Kim, Kogurt, & Yang, 2015). Then, chapter will review research which suggests that increased executive pay relative to that of the average worker is not linked to significantly better firm performance (Carpenter & Sanders, 2002
- Chang, Dasgupta, & Hilary, 2010
- McGregor, 2013). Moreover, the chapter will explore the idea of 'ideal' inequality - i.e. what is considered by society to be a 'fair' gap between executive and low wage worker pay (Kiatpongsan & Norton 2014). Finally, the chapter will review recent policy initiatives to both disclose and cap pay ratios around the world, and the repercussions of such policy decisions on firms, consumers, and society at large (United States Securities and Exchange Commission 2015
- Mohan, Schlager, Deshpande and Norton 2018, Rogoway 2019)
- . 15. Not Equal Pay for All. But, the Right to a Living Wage John A. Hunnes Equal pay for all, that is, everyone in a society should receive the same remuneration regardless of the type of work and the level of effort, is an attractive idea. However, the idea is impossible to realize in reality. From an economic point of view, there are large negative incentive effects with such an arrangement. The reason is that the principle of 'equal pay for all' breaks the relationship between the workers' effort and the payment associated with this effort. For example, why should a person choose to invest in education and/or exercise a high level of effort if the reward is not personalized? Instead of arguing against the idea of 'equal pay for all' from an economic perspective, I want to explore and argue against this idea using arguments from the Catholic Social Teaching (CST), that is, the teaching which "is to be found at the crossroads where Christian life and conscience come into contact with the real world."[2] CST is a collection of official papal encyclical issued from 1891 until today, and which address social issues from family, labor, and wages to climate change and loss of biodiversity. Furthermore, in the CST there are several statements regarding labor, wages, and economic justice. For example, "Remuneration for work should guarantee man the opportunity to provide a dignified livelihood for himself and his family on the material, social, cultural and spiritual level, taking into account the role and the productivity of each, the state of the business, and the common good."[3] As already suggested, in this chapter I want to explore central parts of the CST which present (moral) principles on labor and wages and show how these can be used to argue against the statement 'equal pay for all'. 16. Equal Starting Points - A Basic Income for a Fairer World Jamie Cooke In the chapter I will argue against an equal wage as I think this unsustainable and inequitable. Whilst we need to address the inequality which is rampant in society, and which is fuelled by the breakdown in links between the wages of workers and employers, equalising wages across all jobs would fail to recognise the diversity of experiences, training, responsibility and impact that can be present in them. I also strongly the degree to which this undermines human autonomy - I am a supporter of the state and public services, but believe we need to reimagine them in ways that gives individuals and communities opportunities to have power in, and over, their own lives. Rather, I will argue for the introduction of a basic income, to underpin the wages that people do bring in. This provides a greater degree of equality of starting point (and choice), without enforcing equality of outcome, and rebalances the reciprocal relationship between citizen and state. I will back this up with examples from basic income/direct cash payment experiments around the world, including my own work in the field. SECTION C. FOR EQUAL PAY (This section contains chapters that argue that "equal pay for all" is a good idea.) 17. Economic equality as a precondition for democracy and social justice Lauretta Frederking Equal payment for all is the ideal starting point for a robust democracy and social justice outcomes. Drawing from Rawls 'veil of ignorance' and Frederking's theory of social justice (Frederking, 2015) this chapter confirms the relevance and reasonableness of the condition of economic equality. The case study of Japan after WWII provides additional empirical evidence confirming collective benefits of equalization including solidarity, stable democracy, and national investment in long-run economic growth. However, rather than a simple consideration of the condition of equal payment, this chapter recognizes that the potential benefits depend upon the way in which a community arrives at equal payment for all. Authoritarian seizure, for example, is much less likely to lead to the positive outcomes compared to other factors that support the condition of more equal payments for all including war, environmental disaster, and international alliances. The chapter concludes with the strengths and weaknesses of equilibrating factors around economic equality, democracy, and social justice. Ultimately, the chapter concludes how this may be a fragile, but potentially enduring equilibrium. 18. Defending equal payment for all against objections from the performance principle Jean-Philippe Deranty One strong objection to "equal payment for all" comes from a recognitive approach to justice. In that approach, modern individuals are entitled to make different kinds of justice claims, corresponding to different demands for recognition. On that basis, we should distinguish recognition that emphasises our equal moral standing, which typically ground demands for equal rights, from the recognition of the specific contributions an individual, or group of individuals, makes to social life. This second type of recognition, which German sociology and recognition theory refer to as Leistungsprinzip, the "performance principle", follows a non-egalitarian, meritocratic logic based on the valuation of distinct contributions. Such valuation is inevitably comparative, relating to the value of the individual "Leistung" for the collective, or some intrinsic characters of the performance, for instance its level of complexity, the learning or personal investment it might require. According to the performance principle, it might appear that equal payment for all would breach a key normative underpinning of modern societies. It would rob individuals of a major source of recognition. Indeed, it would undermine a principle that was crucial in replacing old, unjust societies of order, where the distribution of economic and symbolic goods was based on birth and inherited power, with a more egalitarian social model where, ideally at least, individual effort is the sole criterion for social esteem. In this paper, I want to provide a rejoinder to a critique of equal payment for all based on the performance principle. I present three considerations for this rejoinder. First, I highlight the recurrent injustice and arbitrariness of social evaluations of performances, which, for example, systematically undervalue "manual" versus "intellectual" labour. Second, I argue that even if a scale of performances could be objectively established, this would not necessarily justify unequal distribution of economic goods, as other principles might override performance in distributive allocation, namely individual need and the dependence of individual performance on social resources. The third argument is of a negative, preemptive kind and stresses that accepting unequal distribution of economic goods arguably leads to structures of social domination. 19. The Moral Obligation in the matter of equal pay for all and equality Cecilia Gjoertz Fast and Michael Fast This chapter will discuss the philosophical arguments on the matter for equal pay. From a moral position, equal pay is a matter of equality and to recognize the Other as a human being. The chapter defines its arguments and content within the field of moral in being and in the meeting of the Other in any social context, and in society. The inspiration for this discussions and arguments is in Immanuel Kant's sentence, in his work Critique of pure reason: Man must not only be regarded as a means but as an end in itself. Connected to this, he talked about the duty as a part of the teaching of moral: "Two things fill the mind with ever-increasing wonder and awe, the more often and the more intensely the mind of thought is drawn to them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me (Kant 1929). Grounded in this Kant formulate three questions in his search for the understanding the law of moral: What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope? (Kant 1929:635). Moral is bound to the subject, to a universal principle of thru in moral, and to the practical act. The discussion of the moral obligation is also in E.K Logstrup formulation in the ethical claim: "The single human being never has to do with another person without holding his life in his hand." Out of this, the question arises: Is equal and equal pay a matter of moral awareness and self-reflection and as necessary in recognition of the other in society? It is, but this moral awareness is not only towards the other. It also needs to be addressed to the inner reflection of the thought, and toward the discourses in society. This will also mean that the moral awareness also needs to be the foundation of science and thereby to any scientific statements - that this is a moral discussion. Wondering of the moral necessity arises in the concrete encounter with the other. If one stands with the other's life in his hand, is it then not an obligation to act morally towards the other? Philosophers like Edmund Husserl, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Alfred Schutz have all had a focus on the human being and the necessity of an awareness of their own being in understanding. In the same line of thoughts is bringing the necessity of a moral consciousness. In the first part of the ontological position is defined in Husserls phenomenology, and with Kant's theory of cognition and ontology. The subject of the next issue is the reflection of moral in the content of Kants and Logstrups views on moral. The above philosophers are all contributing to defining and reflect on moral as a part of the human being that is brought in to the meeting with the question of equality and equal pay as a matter of moral. Second part of the chapter will discuss the possibility of recognizing and reflection as a necessity of a moral consciousness, and of the recognition of the other as the foundation for any discussion of equality and equal pay. The chapter ends up with reflections on judgments of the necessity of a moral consciousness. They are expressed in three judgments: the judgment of an inner moral consciousness, the judgment of love of the other, and the judgment of the moral cognition. 20. Equal Pay as a Precondition for Justice Matthew Sinnicks and Daniel Pointon Equality is typically presumed to be an outcome of justice. However, in this chapter, we argue that equality may be better understood as a condition of justice on the grounds that inequality is deleterious to the kinds of relationships required to foster communities which sustain justice, both within individual workplaces and the polity at large. As such we offer a qualified argument in favour of equal pay for all. We draw on research into the 'just world fallacy' which shows that people are prone to denigrate innocent victims and admire those who have not earned success based on knowledge of their receiving some harm or benefit respectively. Lerner (1965) discovered that subjects who were informed fellow students had won a random prize tended to consider that those students had studied harder than students who did not win. The just world fallacy has also been shown to apply to those experiencing much more unfortunate circumstances, including AIDS sufferers (Correia et al 2001) and assault victims (Hammock & Richardson 1993). This phenomenon suggests that pay itself is a possible basis for similar judgements of merit or demerit. As such, unequal pay would be liable to undermine notions of justice which focus on the role of community, be that an Aristotelian conception of deliberative community as may apply to individual workplaces (Sinnicks 2018) or a broader, 'democratic egalitarian' sense of the liberal polity based on relational equality in the sense of "equal respect and concern for all citizens" (Anderson, 1999, p.289) - which applies to the context of individual organisations as much as the polity (Neron 2015). Equal pay thus emerges as being deeply conducive to the relationships of equality that justice requires, both insofar as it renders undue deference or derogation less likely, and because it may help to cultivate a suspicion of inequality which is likely to engender the same. Therefore, equal pay for all is a worthy aspiration. Anderson, E. (1999). What is the Point of Equality? Ethics, 109(2), 287-337. Correia, I., Vala, J., & Aguiar, P. (2001). The Effects of Belief in a Just World and Victim's Innocence on Secondary Victimization, Judgements of Justice and Deservingness. Social Justice Research, 14, 327-342. Hammock, G. S., & Richardson, D. (1993). Blaming Drunk Victims: Is it Just World or Sex Role Violation? Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 23, 1574-1586. Lerner, M. J. (1965). Evaluation of Performance as a Function of Performer's Reward and Attractiveness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1(4), 355. Neron, P. Y. (2015). Rethinking the very idea of egalitarian markets and corporations: Why relationships might matter more than distribution. Business Ethics Quarterly, 25(1), 93-124. Sinnicks, M. (2018). The Just World Fallacy as a Challenge to the Business-As-Community Thesis. Business & Society, advance online publication. 21. Future Kropotkinian Anarchism in light of Equal Universal Basic Income Einar Duenger Bohn In chapter 13 of his book, The conquest of bread from 1892, the Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin discusses what he calls the collectivist wages system, a communist society where the means of production are owned by the workers, but a scaled wages system is nonetheless upheld. Kropotkin concludes that such a system is doomed to uphold unjust inequalities, and that nothing but a complete abandonment of the capitalist system such that there are no wages at all will do to eliminate such unjust inequalities in our society. In this paper, I will reconstruct Kropotkin's argument to make it as plausible as possible, assess its premises and presuppositions, and discuss those in light of a future society where machines have replaced manual labor, but an equal universal basic income is in place. I will discuss both options of, on the one hand, a voluntary variable income on top of a universal basic income, but where the pay is the same x for all per hour (so no one can get paid more than 24x per day), and on the other hand, no pay for anyone beyond the universal basic income. One of my conclusions is that we have been too focused on consider the concept of a minimum wage, but we should also start considering the concept of a maximum wage. The future Kropotkinian anarchist knows that everyone deserves something, but no one, and no sub-group, deserves everything. My methods are logically valid a priori argumentation. SECTION D. BEYOND EQUAL PAY (This section contains chapters that either argue that "equal pay" is not sufficient a measure and, thus, argue that also other measures are taken to create equality, or chapters that criticize/argue against the very question that this book rests upon.) 22. Equality, not Equal Pay: Distributional Justice Beyond the Price Mechanism Rohan Grey The goal of achieving economic equality is noble and desirable. However, proposals that attempt to achieve equality of economic outcomes primarily through equalization of incomes end up implicitly reifying and naturalizing the market processes and price systems responsible for turning money wages into real purchasing power. Indeed, determining which public and/or personal goods should be made available for sale in markets, and under what conditions, is a more fundamental issue than the distribution of income between actors within the market. Furthermore, attempts to equalize wages that do not take into account how prices are formed, as well as the way market power is distributed between different actors, are likely to generate unintended (and potentially negative) second and third-order effects. Hence, true economic equality requires structural transformation beyond mere equalization of incomes. We must decenter the cash-nexus and replace it with truly equitable systems of production and distribution. 23. Equal pay for all - but on what scale? Within or between nations, that is the question Jur Schuurman Some definitions and facts. Starting out with a statement on how I adhere to the idea of world citizenship and the implications for equality across the globe, the chapter subsequently presents some facts about (average) incomes at world level, if only to explore the arithmetic of a literal interpretation of 'equal pay for all'. A twofold shift in scale: from individuals to political units and from the national to the global. After exploring on the meanings of 'equal pay' and 'all' (who are 'all'? - how to define 'pay'?), this section will discuss the applicability of the 'equal pay' concept at the individual level and the option of taking instead societies as units of analysis, i.e. looking at inequalities between regions/nations rather than within them, and at the relationship and trade-offs between both levels of (in)equality. The level of individuals seems to be more subject to all sorts of distortions, methodological pitfalls and data misinterpretations, not to mention the question of differential incentives that, although frequently an excuse for maintaining inequalities, has some validity. In other words, instead of talking about individual incomes (either within a certain geographical unit or globally), shouldn't we look at aggregates (nations)? I think we should, and I will argue that point on grounds of feasibility and by a critical discussion of the concepts of global justice and global income equality and the different lines of thought on it, arguing my support for the internationalist/cosmopolitan position within the Global Justice/Equality debate. Obstacles and perspectives. I will finish with some obstacles that I detect for (my interpretation of) 'equal pay' at the global level, and suggested solutions, leading to a brief recapitulation of what it is that we really (should) mean when we talk about income equality and a fair(er) world. 24. Would "equal payment for all" solve (gender) pay discrimination issues? Gudrun Sander and Jonathan Chassot This chapter focusses on the gender pay gap. We argue that even though equal pay for all would solve the wage gap at first sight, there will remain many unsolved problems, which are the reasons behind the gender pay gap. First, we identify the main reasons, which drive this gap and focus on three leading factors: wage negotiation, gender segregation across industries and the low number of women in executive positions. Equal pay for all will certainly solve the negotiation problem but it "will be blind" for power differences, e.g. who decides on what and is therefore still in a "leadership position". The impact of equal pay on gender segregation across industries is unclear because gender role expectations play an important role there. In addition, the fact that the work of women (and their social status) is seen as less valuable in several countries/cultures might not be completely solved by equal pay for all. Furthermore, we argue that the "arena of privileges" will shift away from wages and bonuses to other fields (all might have the same pay, but other privileges will remain or arise). Therefore, we argue that equal pay for all would not be enough. To use a metaphor: Like treating a symptom, when you are ill, but not the causes behind these symptoms. Second, we introduce a wage transparency policy as alternative to equal pay, which would require job postings to disclose salaries. We begin by discussing the immediate impact of such a policy on the current gender wage gap and then turn to the long-term effects of the policy. We argue that a more transparent job market could help close the gender wage gap as well, by creating common grounds for discussion about the fairness of wage differences across industry sectors or functions and thus including the power perspective. 25. Equal pay for a green future Harald Knudsen Within a short time horizon, the global economic community has to deliver on four main challenges to the modern market economy: 1) A global temperature rise in the range of 3-4 centigrades in the present century, and continued rise beyond that, giving rise to enormous disruptions in natural, ecological and social systems, 2) Environmental destruction beyond climate factors, suggesting that huge sectors of production and consumption have to be radically changed and limited, 3) Digitalization and automation giving rise to mass unemployment or underemployment, 4) Income and wealth inequalities that undermine the social contracts of societies at exactly the time when strong bonds between people, legislators and authorities are needed in order to deal with the other crises. Equal pay for all has been suggested primarily as a means to deal with the fourth of the above issues. The present chapter argues that this option is neither necessary nor possible, but that a good proximal solution in the shape of national negative income taxes - or "civil wages" - is both feasible and necessary, both to deal with the income disparity and to deal with the three initial challenges. An ultimate, but unrealistic ideal should not be the enemy of an excellent alternative. Equal pay for all is impossible because 1) There is no way we could even define such an income level. The purchasing power of a dollar differs widely among and even within societies. 2) While civil wages or a negative income tax can be used to improve incomes in the lower end, and while progressive taxation can be used to dampen overall income differences, a target of equal pay would mean to control for all other sources of incomes and losses, which in a liberal society would make an equality-assessment impossible, and implementation would call for dictatorial powers and severe limitations of freedom. [1] See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hsIpQ7YguGE, at 2:35. [2] Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace. (2005). Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church. Bloomsbury, p. 36. [3] Catholic Church. (2000). Catechism of the Catholic Church: Popular Revised Edition. Burns & Oates, paragraph 2434.
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