Frustrated majorities : how issue intensity enables smaller groups of voters to get what they want
著者
書誌事項
Frustrated majorities : how issue intensity enables smaller groups of voters to get what they want
(Political economy of institutions and decisions)
Cambridge University Press, 2022
- : pbk
大学図書館所蔵 全2件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
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  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
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  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. 221-232) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Democratic elections do not always deliver what majorities want. Many conclude from frustrated majorities a failure of democracy. This book argues the opposite may be true - that politicians who represent their constituents sometimes frustrate majorities. A theory of issue intensity explains how the intensity with which different voters care about political issues drives key features of elections, political participation, representation, and public policy. Because candidates for office are more certain of winning the votes of those who care intensely, they sometimes side with an intense minority over a less intense majority. Voters who care intensely communicate their intensity by taking political action: volunteering, contributing, and speaking out. From questions like whose voices should matter in a democracy to whose voices actually matter, this rigorous book blends ideas from democratic theory and formal political economy with new empirical evidence to tackle a topic of central importance to American politics.
目次
- Part I. Frustrated Majorities, Issue Intensity, and Political Action: 1. Majoritarian politics and minority interests
- 2. The political science of representation, elections, and intensity
- Part II. Argument: An Intensity Theory of Electoral Competition: 3. Sketching a theory of intensity and electoral competition
- 4. Theory and model results: Issue intensity, costly action, and minority representation
- 5. Model extensions: Varying size of the minority, the free-rider problem, and social welfare
- Part III. Evidence: Empirical Patterns and Intensity Theory: 6. Introduction to empirical evidence
- 7. Politicians side with intense minorities
- 8. Issues of intensity explain vote choice
- 9. Opening avenues of costly action: Institutional change to costs of campaign contributions
- 10. Closing avenues of costly action: Reform to primary elections
- Part IV. Conclusions: 11. Conclusion: Implications for representative democracy and the study of politics
- Part V. Appendix A. Mathematical model of intensity and electoral competition
- B. Formalities of Chapter 5
- C. Supplementary information for Chapter 8
- D. Supplementary information for Chapter 9
- E. Supplementary information for Chapter 10
- Bibliography
- Index.
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