Antitrust policy in health care markets
著者
書誌事項
Antitrust policy in health care markets
Cambridge University Press, 2023
- : pbk
大学図書館所蔵 全4件
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  京都
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  奈良
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  鳥取
  島根
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  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
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注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Health care costs in the United States are much higher than in other countries. These cost differences can be explained in part by a lack of competition in the United States. Some markets, such as pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, have elements of monopoly. Other markets, such as health insurance, have elements of monopsony. Many other markets may be subject to collusion on prices, such as generic drugs, or wages, such as the nurse labor market. Lawful monopoly and monopsony are beyond the reach of antitrust laws, but collusion is not. When appropriate, vigorous antitrust enforcement challenging anticompetitive conduct can aid in reducing health care costs. This book addresses monopoly, monopsony, cartels of sellers and buyers, horizontal and vertical merger policy, and antitrust enforcement through private suits as well as the efforts of the antitrust Agencies. The authors demonstrate how enforcing antitrust laws can ultimately promote competition and reduce health care costs.
目次
- 1. Health care markets and competition policy
- 2. Antitrust policy in the United States
- Section I. Monopoly: 3 Patents and monopoly pricing of pharmaceuticals
- 4. Patents and exclusionary product hopping
- 5. Bundled discounts and peace health
- Section II. Seller Cartels: 6. Collusion in health care markets
- 7. Collusion in generic drug markets
- 8. The hatch-waxman act, patent infringement suits, and reverse payments
- Appendix
- The economics of settlements
- 9. The alleged insulin conspiracy
- 10. Licensing of health care professionals
- Section III. Monopsony: 11. Monopsony, dominant buyers, and oligopsony
- 12. Countervailing power - physician collective bargaining
- 13. Group purchasing organizations, monopsony, and antitrust policy
- Section IV. Buyer Cartels: 14. Collusion in the nurse labor market
- 15. Collusion in the oocyte market
- 16. No-Poaching agreements and antitrust policy
- Section V. Mergers and Acquisitions: 17. The economics of horizontal mergers
- 18. Horizontal merger policy
- 19. The economic theory of vertical integration
- 20. Vertical merger policy
- 21. Concluding remarks.
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