Meta-theory of law
著者
書誌事項
Meta-theory of law
（Sciences, . Sociology,
ISTE , Wiley, 2022
大学図書館所蔵 全1件
注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This book is devoted to the theory of legal theory, also referred to as the "meta-theory of law".
The aim of this emerging discipline is to determine the objectives, aims and methods of legal theory, and to establish the conditions of possibility as well as the validity criteria for theoretical discourse on law. The contributions in this book provide an overview of these aspects through different perspectives and approaches.
The very purpose of legal theory has been disputed and the subject area is currently subject to increasing cross-fertilization between different, and sometimes diverging, traditions. Meta-theory of Law assesses these emerging trends by questioning two basic objects of legal theory, the "nature" and the "science" of law.
目次
- Introduction xiii Mathieu CARPENTIER Part 1 Legal Theory Methods 1 Chapter 1 Methodology in Legal Philosophy 3 Julie DICKSON 1.1 Introduction: methodology in legal philosophy 3 1.2 The nature of law? 5 1.3 Changing questions: diversity and development 13 1.4 Directly evaluative legal philosophy versus indirectly evaluative legal philosophy 19 1.5 Conclusion 28 Chapter 2 The Methodology of Analytic Jurisprudence 31 Pierluigi CHIASSONI 2.1 Foreword 31 2.2 The principles of an analytic approach to jurisprudence 32 2.3 The statute of analytic jurisprudence 38 2.4 Two sets of analytic tools 41 2.4.1 Tools for the analysis of legal discourses 42 2.4.2 Tools for the refinement of extant juridical terminological and conceptual apparatuses 48 2.4.3 The tools of analytic jurisprudence and conceptual analysis 52 2.5 Vindicating a modest and reconstructive variety of conceptual analysis 53 2.6 Vindicating the analytic approach (and the principle of simplicity) against "essentialist" jurisprudence 58 2.7 References 68 Chapter 3 Methodology for Theorizing About the Nature of Law and About Doctrinal Areas of Law 75 Brian H BIX 3.1 Introduction 75 3.2 Theories of the nature of law 75 3.2.1 Increasing philosophical sophistication 76 3.2.2 Hans Kelsen 77 3.2.3 H.L.A Hart 78 3.2.4 Ronald Dworkin 79 3.2.5 Joseph Raz 80 3.2.6 John Finnis 81 3.2.7 Frederick Schauer 81 3.2.8 Brian Leiter 82 3.2.9 Mark Greenberg 83 3.3 Theories of doctrinal areas 83 3.3.1 Descriptive, prescriptive and neutral 84 3.3.2 Purposes 85 3.3.3 Universal versus parochial 85 3.3.4 The subject of explanation (the data) 86 3.3.5 Justice and autonomy or efficiency 86 3.4 Conclusion 87 3.5 References 87 Chapter 4 Empirical Complexity as a Conceptual Claim: Reappraising Hart's Account of Law as a Complex Social Practice 93 Gregory BLIGH 4.1 Introduction 93 4.1.1 No place for empirical science in Hartian jurisprudence 94 4.1.2 Hart's object: "characterizing" the "complexity" of the legal system 96 4.1.3 Two key sources of influence: J.L Austin and P.F Strawson 99 4.1.4 Do the (linguistic) twist 101 4.2 Hart's Austinian account of the quotidian empirical statement 106 4.2.1 A critique of reductive sense-data empiricism 106 4.2.2 Accounting for the complexity of experience 112 4.3 Rejecting the descriptive fallacy 115 4.3.1 A critique of Russell's theory of meaning 116 4.3.2 A rejection of the descriptive fallacy carried over into Hart's jurisprudence 122 4.4 The empirical relevance of the conceptual scheme in The Concept of Law 126 4.4.1 "Descriptive metaphysics" and "linguistic phenomenology" 127 4.4.2 Empirical complexity and presupposition in The Concept of Law 135 4.5 Conclusion 140 4.6 References 142 Chapter 5 Authoritative Disagreement: Meta-Legal Theory and the Semantics of Adjudication 149 Andrej KRISTAN and Giulia PRAVATO 5.1 Introduction 149 5.2 Explananda 150 5.2.1 Authoritative disagreement in fact-oriented interpretation 150 5.2.2 Authoritative disagreement in text-oriented interpretation 151 5.3 Meta-theoretic demarcation 154 5.3.1 Rule-skeptical legal positivism 155 5.3.2 Conventionalist legal positivism 155 5.3.3 Interpretivist legal antipositivism 156 5.4 Semantic explanations 157 5.4.1 Semantic invariantism 158 5.4.2 Expressivism 159 5.4.3 Indexical contextualism 161 5.4.4 Non-indexical contextualism 164 5.4.5 Dialetheism 164 5.4.6 Content relativism 165 5.4.7 Assessment relativism 166 5.4.8 Truth-value indeterminism 168 5.5 Conclusion 169 5.6 References 170 Chapter 6 Jeremy Waldron, the Legitimacy of Judicial Review and Political Political Theory 179 Charles-Maxime PANACCIO 6.1 Introduction 179 6.2 The first Waldron 180 6.2.1 The circumstances of politics 180 6.2.2 Political political theory 181 6.2.3 Rights 182 6.2.4 CRJR 182 6.3 Reviews of the first Waldron 184 6.3.1 The nature of disagreement 184 6.3.2 Substance and results versus process and procedure 185 6.3.3 CRJR 187 6.4 The second Waldron 187 6.5 Conclusion 191 6.6 References 192 Part 2 Legal Science Theories 195 Chapter 7 Metatheory of an (Empirical) Legal Science 197 Eric MILLARD 7.1 General framework: theory, metatheory and metascience 197 7.1.1 Theory and metatheory 197 7.1.2 A theory of legal science as a metascience 200 7.1.3 A theory of (empirical) legal science 201 7.1.4 A theory of (empirical legal) science as applied metatheory 205 7.2 (Meta)theoretical theses of an (empirical) legal science 206 7.2.1 Epistemological thesis 208 7.2.2 Meta-ethical thesis 209 7.2.3 Methodological thesis 212 Chapter 8 Legal and Social Sciences: What are the Links? 215 Veronique CHAMPEIL-DESPLATS 8.1 Social sciences, a factor in redefining legal sciences 218 8.1.1 Epistemological movements: the positioning of legal sciences between exact, physical and natural sciences and social sciences 218 8.1.2 Heuristic movements: the reinvigoration of legal sciences by the social sciences 221 8.2 The modalities of disciplinary articulations 225 8.2.1 Difficulties and pitfalls 225 8.2.2 Interdisciplinary experiences and the pragmatism of interweaving knowledge 228 8.3 References 231 Chapter 9 A Hermeneutic Reading of Law and Legal Theory: Regarding Paul Ricoeur 235 Xavier BIOY and Thomas ESCACH-DUBOURG 9.1 The outcome of a long journey, from the interpretive method to a general epistemology 237 9.1.1 A philosophy of interpretation 237 9.1.2 A hermeneutic of symbols as a propaedeutic of a grand philosophy: the symbol suggests 243 9.2 Hermeneutic and textual disciplines 247 9.2.1 The conceptual break brought about by textual hermeneutics: the paradigm of textuality 248 9.2.2 The methodological break brought about by textual hermeneutics: reading and textual interpretation 253 9.3 Law as a hermeneutical discipline 257 9.3.1 Interpretation of the law: quoting the law and understanding it are one and the same thing 257 9.3.2 Interpretation by law and interpretation in law 260 Chapter 10 Legal Science According to the Pure Theory of Law 265 Thomas HOCHMANN 10.1 The negation of legal science (Sander) 267 10.2 The defense of legal science (Merkl) 270 10.3 Legal science pushed into the background (Kelsen) 276 10.3.1 Absence of denial of legal science 277 10.3.2 A theory of law, not of legal science 278 10.3.3 An interest in decision, not knowledge 279 10.3.4 A regression: the theory of the tacit alternative clause 281 Chapter 11 Axiological Neutrality, Oppositional Thinking and Knowledge 285 Jean-Baptiste POINTEL 11.1 The three aspects of a theory 285 11.1.1 Pascal's wager, a textbook case 286 11.1.2 A scientific theory of law 288 11.1.3 A factual analysis of "ought to be" 289 11.2 "Hume's Guillotine", a false foundation for axiological neutrality 290 11.2.1 The definition of "Hume's Guillotine", an error of interpretation 290 11.2.2 The meaning of "Hume's Guillotine", explaining its motivations 291 11.2.3 The consequence of "Hume's Guillotine", a return to argument 292 11.2.4 Purity or axiological neutrality, a return to Max Weber 293 11.2.5 Language acts in John L Austin, the inevitable fusion between descriptive and prescriptive 294 11.2.6 Platonic reductionism, a problematological repression 295 11.2.7 The importance of the implicit, a more scientific approach 296 11.3 Oppositional commitment to the theory 298 11.3.1 The critical eye, connecting analysis to policy 298 11.3.2 Scientific purity, a political program 299 11.3.3 Methodological anarchism, a basis for research 300 11.3.4 The archaeology of knowledge, a critical method 302 11.3.5 Example: the concept of state tyranny 303 11.3.6 Oppositional knowledge in law, a program to be defined 304 11.4 A new disciplinary ethics, but for which academic field? 305 11.5 References 306 Chapter 12 Legal Science and Its Roles in Legal Reasoning 311 Fabio Perin SHECAIRA 12.1 The concept of a source of law 311 12.1.1 Explicit reference in legal practice 312 12.1.2 Prescriptions that serve as content-independent reasons 313 12.2 Arguments from authority 314 12.3 Types of scholarly authority 316 12.3.1 Describing and prescribing 316 12.3.2 Can legal science really serve as practical authority? 319 12.3.3 A note on legitimate and de facto authority 323 12.4 Implications for jurisprudence 324 12.5 Conclusion 327 12.6 References 327 Chapter 13 Inference to the Best Explanation in Legal Science
- on Balancing Contrastive Hypotheses 329 David DUARTE 13.1 Normative propositions in legal science 329 13.2 Inference to the best explanation 337 13.3 Speculative (hypothetical) normative propositions and inference to the best explanation 343 13.4 Contrastive hypotheses in balancing 346 13.5 References 353 List of Authors 359 Index 361
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