Agency, morality and law
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Agency, morality and law
(European Academy of legal theory series, v. 17)
Hart, 2022
- : hb
Available at 2 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. [164]-167) and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
How does law possess the normative force it requires to direct our actions?
This book argues that this seemingly innocuous question is of central importance to the philosophy of law and, by extension, of the very concept of law itself. It advances a position grounded in the secular natural law tradition, and in doing so addresses the two success criteria for this position head on:
Firstly, that commitment to the existence of a supreme moral principle is required;
Secondly, that any supreme moral principle must be identifiable through human reason.
The book argues that these conditions are met by Alan Gewirth's Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC), which - through a dialectically necessary argument - locates the existence of universally applicable moral norms in the concept of agency. Given the very purpose of law is to guide action, legal norms must be located in a unified hierarchy of practical reason. It follows that, if law is to succeed in claiming to be capable of guiding our action, moral permissibility with reference to the PGC is a necessary condition of a rule's legal validity.
This strong theory of natural law is defended throughout, both against moral sceptics and positions within contemporary legal positivism.
Table of Contents
PART 1
ESTABLISHING THE PGC AS A SUPREME MORAL PRINCIPLE
1. The PGC as a Supreme Moral Principle
1. Introduction
2. The Dialectical Necessity of Morality
3. Philosophical Criticisms of the PGC
4. Conclusion
2. The PGC in Raz's Hierarchy of Reasons
1. Introduction
2. Raz on the Nature of Reasons
3. Resolving Conflicts between Reasons
4. Conclusion
PART 2
ESTABLISHING PERMISSIBILITY WITH REFERENCE TO THE PGC AS A NECESSARY CONDITION OF A RULE'S LEGAL VALIDITY
3. Agency, Morality and Law
1. Introduction
2. The PGC and Legal Norms
3. The Operation of the PGC within a Legal System
4. Conclusion
4. Raz and Legitimate Legal Authority
1. Introduction
2. Raz, Legal Authority and the Contingency Thesis
3. Authority to Make Law and the Sources Thesis
4. Systemic Functionality
5. Obligations to Obey the Law
6. Conclusion
5. Contemporary Inclusive Positivism
1. Introduction
2. David Lyons and Formalism
3. Incorporationism and Jules Coleman
4. The Moderate Incorporationism of Matthew Kramer
5. Conclusion
Conclusion
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