Subjective versus objective moral wrongness

Author(s)

Bibliographic Information

Subjective versus objective moral wrongness

Peter A. Graham

(Cambridge elements, . Elements in ethics / edited by Ben Eggleston, Dale E. Miller)

Cambridge University Press, 2021

  • : pbk

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Note

Includes bibliographical references (p. [57]-60)

Description and Table of Contents

Description

There is presently a debate between Subjectivists and Objectivists about moral wrongness. Subjectivism is the view that the moral status of our actions, whether they are morally wrong or not, is grounded in our subjective circumstances - either our beliefs about, or our evidence concerning, the world around us. Objectivism, on the other hand, is the view that the moral status of our actions is grounded in our objective circumstances - all those facts other than those which comprise our subjective circumstances. A third view, Ecumenism, has it that the moral status of our actions is grounded both in our subjective and our objective circumstances. After outlining and evaluating the various arguments both against Subjectivism and against Objectivism, this Element offers a tentative defense of Objectivism about moral wrongness.

Table of Contents

  • 1. Subjectivism, Objectivism, and Ecumenism
  • 2. The Sense-Splitting Reply
  • 3. Against Objectivism
  • 4. Against Subjectivism
  • 5. Objectivism or Ecumenism?

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Details

  • NCID
    BD00448102
  • ISBN
    • 9781108706612
  • Country Code
    uk
  • Title Language Code
    eng
  • Text Language Code
    eng
  • Place of Publication
    Cambridge
  • Pages/Volumes
    60 p.
  • Size
    23 cm
  • Classification
  • Subject Headings
  • Parent Bibliography ID
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