The dictator's dilemma at the ballot box : electoral manipulation, economic maneuvering, and political order in autocracies

Bibliographic Information

The dictator's dilemma at the ballot box : electoral manipulation, economic maneuvering, and political order in autocracies

Masaaki Higashijima

(Weiser center for emerging democracies)

University of Michigan Press, 2022

  • : hbk

Search this Book/Journal
Note

Includes bibliographical references (p. 301-324) and index

Description and Table of Contents

Description

Modern dictatorships hold elections. Contrary to our stereotypical views of autocratic politics, dictators often introduce elections with limited manipulation wherein they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud and pro-regime electoral institutions. Why do such electoral reforms happen in autocracies? Do these elections destabilize autocratic rule? The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box explores how dictators design elections and what consequences those elections have on political order. It argues that strong autocrats who can effectively garner popular support through extensive economic distribution become less dependent on coercive electioneering strategies. When autocrats fail to design elections properly, elections backfire in the form of coups, protests, and the opposition's stunning election victories. The book's theoretical implications are tested on a battery of cross-national analyses with newly collected data on autocratic elections and in-depth comparative case studies of the two Central Asian republics-Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The book's findings suggest that indicators of free and fair elections in dictatorships may not be enough to achieve full-fledged democratization.

Table of Contents

List of Figures List of Tables List of Abbreviations Note on Translation and Transliteration Preface Acknowledgements Part I: Puzzles and Arguments Chapter 1: Introduction Chapter 2: A Theory of Autocratic Elections Part II: Cross-National Explorations Chapter 3: Blatant Electoral Fraud Chapter 4: Institutional Manipulation Chapter 5: Economic Maneuvering Chapter 6: Backfiring at the Ballot Box Part III: Comparative Case Studies Chapter 7: From Electoral Manipulation to Economic Maneuvering: Nazarbaev's Kazakhstan Chapter 8: From Electoral Manipulation to Autocratic Breakdown: Akaev's Kyrgyzstan Chapter 9: Conclusion References Appendix

by "Nielsen BookData"

Related Books: 1-1 of 1
Details
Page Top