Following their leaders : political preferences and public policy
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Following their leaders : political preferences and public policy
(Cambridge studies in economics, choice, and society)
Cambridge University Press, 2023
- : pbk
Available at 3 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
Note
Summary: "Policies are designed by the elite and the masses actually have little say. While models of democratic decision-making tend to assume that voters have preferences, and that candidates and parties conform to those preferences, voters instead adopt the policies of those political elites -- they follow their leaders"--Provided by publisher
Includes bibliographical references and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Models of democratic decision-making tend to assume that voters have preferences and that candidates adjust their platforms to conform with those preferences; however, the direction of causation is largely the opposite. Political elites offer policy platforms to voters, and voters adopt those policies - they follow their leaders. Following Their Leaders argues that policies are designed by the elite and the electorate has little say. Preferences for public policy tend to be anchored in a political identity associated with a candidate, party, or ideology; voters' preferences on most issues are derived from their anchor preferences. Holcombe argues that because citizens adopt the policies offered by the elite, democratic institutions are ineffective constraints on the exercise of political power. This volume explores political institutions that help control the elite who exercise political power and discusses the implications political preferences have on democracies.
Table of Contents
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Instrumental and Expressive Preferences
- 3. Influences Over Preference Formation
- 4. Preference Aggregation Through Voting
- 5. The Formation of Political Preferences
- 6. Anchor Preferences and Derivative Preferences
- 7. Preferences of Elites and Masses
- 8. Policies that Maximize Political Power
- 9. Patriotism, Propaganda, and the Public Interest
- 10. Implications for Democracy.
by "Nielsen BookData"