Defense management reform : how to make the Pentagon work better and cost less
著者
書誌事項
Defense management reform : how to make the Pentagon work better and cost less
Stanford University Press, c2020
- : pbk
大学図書館所蔵 全1件
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注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Pentagon spending has been the target of decades of criticism and reform efforts. Billions of dollars are spent on weapons programs that are later abandoned. State-of-the-art data centers are underutilized and overstaffed. New business systems are built at great expense but fail to meet the needs of their users. Every Secretary of Defense for the last five Administrations has made it a priority to address perceived bloat and inefficiency by making management reform a major priority. The congressional defense committees have been just as active, enacting hundreds of legislative provisions. Yet few of these initiatives produce significant results, and the Pentagon appears to go on, as wasteful as ever.
In this book, Peter Levine addresses why, despite a long history of attempted reform, the Pentagon continues to struggle to reduce waste and inefficiency. The heart of Defense Management Reform is three case studies covering civilian personnel, acquisitions, and financial management. Narrated with the insight of an insider, the result is a clear understanding of what went wrong in the past and a set of concrete guidelines to plot a better future.
目次
Contents and Abstracts1Civilian Personnel Reform at the Department of Defense chapter abstractThe National Security Personnel System (NSPS) was initiated at a time of consensus that the old civil service system was overly bureaucratic, inflexible, and in need of reform. It received an unprecedented level of resources, but still failed. The Bush administration helped strengthen opposition by insisting on comprehensive changes to the collective bargaining and employee appeals systems that were largely unrelated to the reform's core purpose of linking pay to performance. The NSPS made changes to parts of the system that needed to be changed, but it also changed parts of the system that were working reasonably well. In the end, it failed because of the controversy generated by parts of the new system that may not have been necessary at all, and this failure dragged down the prospect of constructive reform for at least another decade.
2Lessons from the Never-Ending Search for Acquisition Reform chapter abstractOver the last forty years, the DOD has undertaken at least five cycles of acquisition reform, seeking at various times to centralize control over major defense acquisition programs, to devolve more responsibility to the military services, to reign in acquisition abuses with additional guidance, and to rid the DOD and its contractors of excess regulations. While these reforms were all driven by public outrage about cost growth and acquisition abuses, they had wildly different results. The Packard Commission reforms and the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 were the most successful of the reforms because they identified poor front-end decision making as the most significant source of cost growth in the acquisition of major weapon systems and developed a focused set of solutions for that problem.
3Auditing the Pentagon chapter abstractOver the last three decades, the DOD has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in planning activities, billions of dollars in efforts to compile and reconcile financial data, and tens billions of dollars in new financial systems, but has gotten no closer to an auditable financial statement. In fact, an auditable financial statement provides little value for management purposes and may not even be the right goal. The department's bookkeeping problems are the result of a maze of deficient systems, poor controls, dysfunctional processes, and stovepiped organizations, none of which can be fixed by management fiat. The DOD has made the most progress in addressing these problems when it has taken an incremental approach and settled for improved systems and processes that were less than perfect for audit and accounting purposes.
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