Conquests and rents : a political economy of dictatorship and violence in Muslim societies
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Conquests and rents : a political economy of dictatorship and violence in Muslim societies
(Political economy of institutions and decisions)
Cambridge University Press, 2023
- : hardback
Available at 1 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 275-290) and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Tragically, dictatorship and civil strife have led to less developed, less democratic, and more conflict-prone contemporary Muslim-majority societies. Ahmed argues, however, neither Islam nor aspects of Muslim culture are the cause. Grounded in a positive political economy approach, Conquests and Rents investigates why these societies are predisposed to political violence and low levels of development. Focusing on the role of political institutions and economic rents, Ahmed argues that territories where Islam spread via military conquest developed institutions and practices impervious to democracy and more prone to civil war, while societies in non-conquered territories developed governance structures more susceptible to democracy when rents decline. Conquests and Rents introduces a novel theoretical argument, with corroborative qualitative and statistical analysis, to examine the interplay of the historical legacy of institutions from the premodern period and contemporary rent streams in Muslim-majority societies.
Table of Contents
- Part I. A Political Economy Approach: 1. Political violence
- 2. Analytical framework
- Part II. The Institutional Legacy of Muslim Conquest: 3. The conquest equilibrium
- 4. Conquest fostered autocratization
- 5. The autocratic legacy of Muslim conquest
- Part III. The impact of contemporary rents on dictatorship and violence: 6. Fueling authoritarian resilience
- 7. Aiding political violence
- 8. Democratic transitions in non-Muslim societies
- Part IV. Conclusion: 9. Conclusion.
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