Bullets not ballots : success in counterinsurgency warfare
著者
書誌事項
Bullets not ballots : success in counterinsurgency warfare
(Cornell studies in security affairs / edited by Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis, and Stephen M. Walt)
Cornell University Press, 2021
- : hbk
大学図書館所蔵 全2件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
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  群馬
  埼玉
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  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
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  石川
  福井
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  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
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注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
In Bullets Not Ballots, Jacqueline L. Hazelton challenges the claim that winning "hearts and minds" is critical to successful counterinsurgency campaigns. Good governance, this conventional wisdom holds, gains the besieged government popular support, denies support to the insurgency, and makes military victory possible. Hazelton argues that major counterinsurgent successes since World War II have resulted not through democratic reforms but rather through the use of military force against civilians and the co-optation of rival elites.
Hazelton offers new analyses of five historical cases frequently held up as examples of the effectiveness of good governance in ending rebellions-the Malayan Emergency, the Greek Civil War, the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines, the Dhofar rebellion in Oman, and the Salvadoran Civil War-to show that, although unpalatable, it was really brutal repression and bribery that brought each conflict to an end. By showing how compellence works in intrastate conflicts, Bullets Not Ballots makes clear that whether or not the international community decides these human, moral, and material costs are acceptable, responsible policymaking requires recognizing the actual components of counterinsurgent success-and the limited influence that external powers have over the tactics of counterinsurgent elites.
目次
1. Counterinsurgency: Eating Soup with a Chainsaw
2. Counterinsurgency: What It Is and Is Not
3. Not the Wars You're Looking For: Malaya, Greece, the Philippines
4. A New Laboratory: Dhofar, Oman
5. High Cost Success: El Salvador
6. How Much Does the Compellence Theory Explain? Turkey and the PKK
7. Counterinsurgency Success: Costs High and Rising
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