Cross-domain deterrence : strategy in an era of complexity
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Cross-domain deterrence : strategy in an era of complexity
Oxford University Press, c2019
- : [hardcover]
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  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
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  United States of America
Note
Includes index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
The complexity of the twenty-first century threat landscape contrasts markedly with the bilateral nuclear bargaining context envisioned by classical deterrence theory. Nuclear and conventional arsenals continue to develop alongside anti-satellite programs, autonomous robotics or drones, cyber operations, biotechnology, and other innovations barely imagined in the early nuclear age. The concept of cross-domain deterrence (CDD) emerged near the end of the George W.
Bush administration as policymakers and commanders confronted emerging threats to vital military systems in space and cyberspace. The Pentagon now recognizes five operational environments or so-called domains (land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace), and CDD poses serious problems in practice. In
Cross-Domain Deterrence, Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay assess the theoretical relevance of CDD for the field of International Relations. As a general concept, CDD posits that how actors choose to deter affects the quality of the deterrence they achieve. Contributors to this volume include senior and junior scholars and national security practitioners. Their chapters probe the analytical utility of CDD by examining how differences across, and combinations of, different military and
non-military instruments can affect choices and outcomes in coercive policy in historical and contemporary cases.
Table of Contents
Introduction
1. Cross-Domain Deterrence, from Practice to Theory
Jon Lindsay and Erik Gartzke
The Concept of Cross-Domain Deterrence
2. Cross-Domain Deterrence in American Foreign Policy
Michael Nacht, Patricia Schuster, and Eva Uribe
3. The Past and Future of Deterrence Theory
Patrick M. Morgan
4. Simplicity and Complexity in the Nth Nuclear Era
Ron Lehman
Strategic Implications of Different Military Domains
5. Deterrence in and through Cyberspace
Jacquelyn Schneider
6. Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Instability of Deterrence
Benjamin Bahney, Jonathan Pearl, and Michael Markey
7. Air Power Versus Ground Forces: Deterrence at the Operational Level of War
Phil Haun
8. Sea Power Versus Land Power: Cross-Domain Deterrence in the Peloponnesian War
Joshua Rovner
Communication and Credibility across Domains
9. International Law and the Common Knowledge Requirements of Cross-Domain Deterrence
James Morrow
10. Signaling with Secrets: Evidence on Soviet Perceptions and Counterforce Developments in the Late Cold War
Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin G. Long
11. Extended Deterrence and Assurance in Multiple Domains
Rupal Mehta
Interactions across Military and Nonmilitary Domains
12. Asymmetric Advantage: Weaponizing People as Non-Military Instruments of Cross-Domain Coercion
Kelly Greenhill
13. Linkage Politics: Managing the End of the Cold War
Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson
14. Beyond Military Deterrence: The Multidimensionality of International Relations in East Asia
Chin-Hao Huang and David Kang
Conclusion
15. The Analytic Potential of Cross-Domain Deterrence
Jon Lindsay and Erik Gartzke
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