CiNii 図書 - Online and matching-based market design

The rich, multi-faceted and multi-disciplinary field of matching-based market design is an active and important one due to its highly successful applications with economic and sociological impact. Its home is economics, but with intimate connections to algorithm design and operations research. With chapters contributed by over fifty top researchers from all three disciplines, this volume is unique in its breadth and depth, while still being a cohesive and unified picture of the field, suitable for the uninitiated as well as the expert. It explains the dominant ideas from computer science and economics underlying the most important results on market design and introduces the main algorithmic questions and combinatorial structures. Methodologies and applications from both the pre-Internet and post-Internet eras are covered in detail. Key chapters discuss the basic notions of efficiency, fairness and incentives, and the way market design seeks solutions guided by normative criteria borrowed from social choice theory.

Preface
Foreword Alvin E. Roth
Part I. Foundations of Market Design: 1. Two-sided markets: stable matching Federico Echenique, Nicole Immorlica and Vijay V. Vazirani
2. One-sided matching markets Federico Echenique, Nicole Immorlica and Vijay V.Vazirani
3. Matching markets with transfers and salaries Federico Echenique, Nicole Immorlica and Vijay V. Vazirani
4. Objectives Federico Echenique, Nicole Immorlica and Vijay V.Vazirani
5. Applications of online matching Zhiyi Huang and Thorben Trobst
6. Online matching in advertisement auctions Nikhil R. Devanur and Aranyak Mehta
7. Spectrum auctions from the perspective of matching Paul Milgrom and Andrew Vogt
8. School choice Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Aram Grigoryam
9. Kidney exchange Itai Ashlagi
10. Normative properties for object allocation problems: characterizations and trade-offs Lars Ehlers and Bettina Klaus
11. Choice and market design Samson Alva and Battal Dogan
12. Combinatorics of stable matchings Tamas Fleiner
13. Algorithmics of matching markets Jiehua Chen and David Manlove
14. Generalized matching: contracts and networks John William Hatfield, Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky, Alexander Teytelboym and Alexander Westkamp
15. Complementarities and externalities Thanh Nguyen and Rakesh Vohra
16. Large matching markets Jacob D. Leshno
17. Pseudomarkets Marek Pycia
18. Dynamic matching Mariagiovanna Baccara and Leeat Yariv
19. Matching with search frictions Hector Chade and Philipp Kircher
20. Unraveling Hanna Halaburda and Guillaume Haeringer
21. Investment in matching markets Matthew Elliott and Eduard Talamas
22. Signaling in two-sided matching markets Soohyung Lee
23. Two-sided markets matching design Renato Gomez and Alessandro Pavan
24. Matching market experiments Yan Chen
25. Empirical models of non-transferable utility matching Nikhil Agarwal and Paulo Somaini
26. Structural estimation of matching markets with transferable utility Alfred Galichon and Bernard Salanie
27. New solution concepts Shengwu Li and Irene Lo
28. Machine learning for matching markets Zhe Feng, David C. Parkes and Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath
29. Contract theory Gabriel Carroll
30. Secretaries, prophets, and applications to matching Michal Feldman and Brendan Lucier
31. Exploration and persuasion Aleksandrs Slivkins
32. Fairness in prediction and allocation Jamie Morgenstern and Aaron L. Roth.

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Online and matching-based market design

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