{"@context":{"owl":"http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#","bibo":"http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/","foaf":"http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/","rdfs":"http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#","prism":"http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/basic/2.0/","cinii":"http://ci.nii.ac.jp/ns/1.0/","dc":"http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/","dcterms":"http://purl.org/dc/terms/"},"@id":"https://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BD10499041.json","@graph":[{"@id":"https://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BD10499041#entity","@type":"bibo:Book","foaf:isPrimaryTopicOf":{"@id":"https://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BD10499041.json"},"dc:title":[{"@value":"Challenging knowledge : how we (sometimes) don't know what we think we know"}],"dc:creator":"Jody Azzouni","dc:publisher":[{"@value":"Oxford University Press"}],"dcterms:extent":"xii, 304 pages","cinii:size":"24 cm","dc:language":"eng","dc:date":"2025","cinii:ncid":"BD10499041","cinii:ownerCount":"1","foaf:maker":[{"@id":"https://ci.nii.ac.jp/author/DA08835719#entity","@type":"foaf:Person","foaf:name":[{"@value":"Azzouni, Jody"}]}],"bibo:owner":[{"@id":"https://ci.nii.ac.jp/library/FA014665","@type":"foaf:Organization","foaf:name":"大学共同利用機関法人 人間文化研究機構 国立国語研究所","rdfs:seeAlso":{"@id":"https://libgw.ninjal.ac.jp/mylimedio/search/search.do?target=local&mode=comp&ncid=BD10499041"}}],"bibo:lccn":["2024062146"],"rdfs:seeAlso":[{"@id":"https://lccn.loc.gov/2024062146"}],"prism:publicationDate":["[2025]"],"cinii:note":["Content Type: text (rdacontent), Media Type: unmediated (rdamedia), Carrier Type: volume (rdacarrier)","Includes bibliographical references (pages [291]-298) and index","Summary:\"Starting-point epistemology (SPE) is a new position that, coupled with agent-centered rationality, is the key to resolving philosophical scepticism. SPE acknowledges that metacognitively-sophisticated agents know that they know things and know (something) about the methods by which this happens. Agent-centered rationality implies that a metacognitively-sophisticated agent should only desert a knowledge claim because of a challenge they recognize to be fatal to that claim. Scepticism is metacognitive pathology: Except in those rare cases when an individual is cognitively damaged, sceptical arguments should fail. This book studies the various ways the cognitively healthy can protect themselves from prematurely distrusting what they take themselves to know. A sceptical position results from an agent's failure to correctly monitor their own processes of knowledge-gathering\"-- Provided by publisher"],"dc:subject":["LCC:B837","DC23:149/.73","DC23:149.73"],"foaf:topic":[{"@id":"https://ci.nii.ac.jp/books/search?q=Skepticism","dc:title":"Skepticism"},{"@id":"https://ci.nii.ac.jp/books/search?q=Knowledge%2C+Theory+of","dc:title":"Knowledge, Theory of"},{"@id":"https://ci.nii.ac.jp/books/search?q=Knowledge%2C+Theory+of+fast","dc:title":"Knowledge, Theory of fast"},{"@id":"https://ci.nii.ac.jp/books/search?q=Skepticism+fast","dc:title":"Skepticism fast"}],"dcterms:hasPart":[{"@id":"urn:isbn:9780197789629","dc:title":": hardback"}]}]}