The economics of justice
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
The economics of justice
Harvard University Press, c1983
- : cloth
- : pbk
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The economics of justice / Richard A. Posner
BA11938881
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The economics of justice / Richard A. Posner
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Note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Description and Table of Contents
- Volume
-
: cloth ISBN 9780674235250
Description
Richard A. Posner is probably the leading scholar in the rapidly growing field of the economics of law; he is also an extremely lucid writer. In this book, he applies economic theory to four areas of interest to students of social and legal institutions: the theory of justice, primitive and ancient social and legal institutions, the law and economics of privacy and reputation, and the law and economics of racial discrimination. The book is designed to display the power of economics to organize and illuminate diverse fields in the study of nonmarket behavior and institutions. A central theme is the importance of uncertainty to an understanding of social and legal institutions. Another major theme is that the logic of the law, in many ways but not all, appears to be an economic one: that judges, for example, in interpreting the common law, act as if they were trying to maximize economic welfare.
Part I examines the deficiencies of utilitarianism as both a positive and a normative basis of understanding law, ethics, and social institutions, and suggests in its place the economist's concept of "wealth maximization." Part II, an examination of the social and legal institutions of archaic societies, notably that of ancient Greece and primitive societies, argues that economic analysis holds the key to understanding such diverse features of these societies as reciprocal gift-giving, blood guilt, marriage customs, liability rules, and the prestige accorded to generosity. Many topics relevant to modern social and philosophical debate, including the origin of the state and the retributive theory of punishment, are addressed. Parts III and IV deal with more contemporary social andjurisprudential questions. Part III is an economic analysis of privacy and the statutory and common law rules that protect privacy and related interests-rules that include the tort law of privacy, assault and battery, and defamation. Finally, Part IV examines, again from an economic standpoint, the controversial areas of racial and sexual discrimination, with special reference to affirmative action. Both Part III and Part IV develop as a subtheme the issue of proper standards of constitutional adjudication by the Supreme Court.
- Volume
-
: pbk ISBN 9780674235267
Description
Richard A. Posner is probably the leading scholar in the rapidly growing field of the economics of law; he is also an extremely lucid writer. In this book, he applies economic theory to four areas of interest to students of social and legal institutions: the theory of justice, primitive and ancient social and legal institutions, the law and economics of privacy and reputation, and the law and economics of racial discrimination.
The book is designed to display the power of economics to organize and illuminate diverse fields in the study of nonmarket behavior and institutions. A central theme is the importance of uncertainty to an understanding of social and legal institutions. Another major theme is that the logic of the law, in many ways but not all, appears to be an economic one: that judges, for example, in interpreting the common law, act as if they were trying to maximize economic welfare.
Part I examines the deficiencies of utilitarianism as both a positive and a normative basis of understanding law, ethics, and social institutions, and suggests in its place the economist's concept of "wealth maximization."
Part II, an examination of the social and legal institutions of archaic societies, notably that of ancient Greece and primitive societies, argues that economic analysis holds the key to understanding such diverse features of these societies as reciprocal gift-giving, blood guilt, marriage customs, liability rules, and the prestige accorded to generosity. Many topics relevant to modern social and philosophical debate, including the origin of the state and the retributive theory of punishment, are addressed.
Parts III and IV deal with more contemporary social and jurisprudential questions. Part III is an economic analysis of privacy and the statutory and common law rules that protect privacy and related interests-rules that include the tort law of privacy, assault and battery, and defamation. Finally, Part IV examines, again from an economic standpoint, the controversial areas of racial and sexual discrimination, with special reference to affirmative action. Both Part III and Part IV develop as a sub-theme the issue of proper standards of constitutional adjudication by the Supreme Court.
Table of Contents
1. An Introduction to the Economics of Nonmarket Behavior The Plan of the Book PART I: Justice and Efficiency 2. Blackstone and Bentham Blackstone's Commentaries Bentham's Antipathy to Blackstone Blackstone and Bentham Compared 3. Utilitarianism, Economics, and Social Theory Some Problems of Utilitarianism Wealth Maximization as an Ethical Concept 4. The Ethical and Political Basis of Wealth Maximization The Consensual Basis of Efficiency Implications for the Positive Economic Analysis of Law Dworkin's Critique of Wealth Maximization PART II: The Origins of Justice 5. The Homeric Version of the Minimal State A Taxonomy of Limited Government Government and Political Values in Homer The Homeric Social Order Homeric Individualism Some Modern Parallels The Theory of the State 6. A Theory of Primitive Society The Costs of Information A Model of Primitive Society Other Primitive Adaptations to High Information Costs 7. The Economic Theory of Primitive Law The Legal Process Property Contracts Family Law The System of Strict Liability in Tort Criminal Law 8. Retribution and Related Concepts of Punishment From Revenge to Retribution, and Beyond Pollution: Retribution against Neighbors and Descendants Guilt versus Responsibility PART III: Privacy and Related Interests 9. Privacy as Secrecy The Economics of Private Information and Communications The Tort Law of Privacy 10. A Broader View of Privacy The Etymology of Privacy: Seclusion and Autonomy Evidence for the Economic Theory of Privacy The Common Law and the Economic Theory of Privacy Defamation and Disparagement The Statutory Privacy Movement 11. The Privacy Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court Privacy Cases before Griswold The Griswold Decision Privacy in the Supreme Court since Griswold Conclusion PART IV: The Supreme Court and Discrimination 12. The Law and Economics of Discrimination 13. The DeFunis Case and Reverse Discrimination The Reasonableness of Reverse Discrimination The Constitutional Issue 14. Bakke, Weber, and Beyond Bakke Weber Index
by "Nielsen BookData"