The logic of bureaucratic conduct : an economic analysis of competition, exchange, and efficiency in private and public organizations
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
The logic of bureaucratic conduct : an economic analysis of competition, exchange, and efficiency in private and public organizations
Cambridge University Press, 1982
Available at / 42 libraries
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Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration (RIEB) Library , Kobe University図書
301.4-162s081000082758*
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Note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
In this work the authors present a general theory of bureaucracy and use it to explain behaviour in large organizations and to explain what determines efficiency in both governments and business corporations. The theory uses the methods of standard neoclassical economic theory. It relies on two central principles: that members of an organization trade with one another and that they compete with one another. Authority, which is the basis for conventional theories of bureaucracy, is given a role, despite reliance on the idea of trade between bureaucracies. It is argued, however, that bureaucracies cannot operate efficiently on the basis of authority alone. Exchange between bureaucrats is hampered because promises are not enforceable. So trust and loyalty between members of bureaucratic networks play an important part. The authors find that vertical networks promote efficiency while horizontal ones impede it.
Table of Contents
- 1. Preliminary survey
- 2. Public and private policies
- 3. A theory of selective behaviour
- 4. The accumulation of trust
- 5. The compensation of bureaucrats
- 6. The size distribution of bureaus
- 7. Some applications
- 8. Concluding observations and agenda.
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