Meinong's theory of knowledge
著者
書誌事項
Meinong's theory of knowledge
（Martinus Nijhoff philosophy library, v. 28）
M. Nijhoff, 1987
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注記
Bibliography: p. [113]-119
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
In recent years there has been a renewal of interest in Meinong's work; but since the bulk of it is still encased in his quite forbidding German, most students are limited to the few available translations and to secondary sources. Unfortunately Meinong has been much maligned - only in a few instances with good reason - and has consequently been dealt with lightly. Meinong stood at a very important junction of European philosophical and scien tific thought. In all fields - physics, chemistry, mathematics, psychology, philolo- revolutionary strides were being made. Philosophy, on the other hand, had run its post-Kantian course. New philosophical thinkers came from different disciplines. For example, Frege and later Russell were mathematicians, Boltzmann and Mach were physicists. Earlier Bolzano and then Brentano were originally theologians, and Meinong was a historian. 1 The sciences with their new insights and theories offered an enormous wealth of information which needed to be absorbed philosophically; but traditional philosophy could not deal with it. Physics presented a picture of reality which did not fit into the traditional schemes of empiricism or idealism. Ontological and epistemological questions became once again wide open issues. For example, atoms at first were still considered to be theoretical entities.
目次
I. Meinong, Brentano, Chisholm.- A. Alexius Meinong the Person.- B. Meinong and Brentano.- C. Meinong and Chisholm.- II. Perception.- A. General Remarks.- B. Internal Perception.- C. Sphere of Ideas and Sphere of Judgments.- D. Psychic Analysis.- E. Production of Ideas.- F. Perception of Temporally Distributed Objects.- III. Time and the Temporal.- A. General Remarks.- B. Subjective Time.- C. Persistence.- D. Objective Object Time.- E. Perception of Temporal Determinations.- F. Additional Remarks.- IV. Fantasy.- A. Fantasy Ideas and Dispositions.- B. Production of Fantasy Ideas.- V. Memory.- A. General Remarks.- B. Judgments of Existence.- C. Memory Judgments of Being Thus-and-So.- D. Assumption Versus Judgment.- E. Memory of Objects of External Perception.- F. Memory of Feelings and Their Objects.- G. Remembering Judgments of Subsistence.- H. Negative Memories.- VI. Onevidence.- A. Introduction.- B. Judgments.- C. Preliminary Description of Evidence.- D. Presumtive Evidence.- E. Evidence for Certainty.- F. Evidence as Property.- G. Evidence as Fundamental Act.- H. Evidence as Content.- I. Absence of Evidence in Judgments Capable of Evidence, Unawareness of Present Evidence.- J. Evidence and Truth.- K. Evidence and Linguistic Systems.- L. A Principle of Evidence for Internal Perception.- M. Evidence of Memory Judgments.
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