A cognitive theory of consciousness
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A cognitive theory of consciousness
Cambridge University Press, 1988
- ; hard
- : pbk
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Note
Bibliography: p. 393-409
Includes indexes
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Conscious experience is one of the most difficult and thorny problems in psychological science. Its study has been neglected for many years, either because it was thought to be too difficult, or because the relevant evidence was thought to be poor. Bernard Baars suggests a way to specify empirical constraints on a theory of consciousness by contrasting well-established conscious phenomena - such as stimulus representations known to be attended, perceptual, and informative - with closely comparable unconscious ones - such as stimulus representations known to be preperceptual, unattended, or habituated. Adducing data to show that consciousness is associated with a kind of global workplace in the nervous system, and that several brain structures are known to behave in accordance with his theory, Baars helps to clarify many difficult problems.
Table of Contents
- List of figures and tables
- Preface
- Part I. Introduction: 1. What is to be explained? some preliminaries
- Part II. The Basic Model: 2. Model 1: conscious representations are internally consistent and globally distributed
- 3. The neural basis of conscious experience
- Part III. The Fundamental Role of Context: 4. Model 2: unconscious contexts shape conscious experience
- 5. Model 3: conscious experience is informative - it always demands some degree of adaptation
- Part IV. Goals and Voluntary Control: 6. Model 4: Goal contexts, spontaneous problem solving, and the stream of consciousness
- 7. Model 5: volition as ideomotor control of thought and action
- Part V. Attention, self, and conscious self-monitoring: 8. Model 6: attention as control of access to consciousness
- 9. Model 7. Self as the dominant context of experience and action
- Part VI. Consciousness is Functional: 10. The functions of consciousness
- Part VII. Conclusion: 11. A summary and some future directions
- Glossary and guide to theoretical claims
- References
- Name index, Subject index.
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