Unnatural doubts : epistemological realism and the basis of scepticism
著者
書誌事項
Unnatural doubts : epistemological realism and the basis of scepticism
（Philosophical theory）
B. Blackwell, 1991
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注記
Bibliography: p. [360]-382
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Many philosophers today are pessimistic about our chances for coming up with a satisfactory response to philosophical scepticism. Thus they see an irresolvable conflict between our everyday epistemic attitudes and the inevitably sceptical outcome of philosophical reflection on human knowledge. Michael Williams traces this pessimism to the conviction that sceptical arguments are natural or intuitive, in the sense of minimally dependent on contentious theoretical ideas. In opposition, he argues that scepticism depends essentially on a prior commitment to epistemological realism. This is not realism as a position within epistemology but realism with respect to the objects of epistemological enquiry. Rethinking epistemological realism transforms our understanding, not only of the problem of scepticism, but of the whole range of fundamental epistemological concepts.
目次
- Pessimism in epistemology
- the priority of experience
- epistemological realism
- examples and paradigms
- scepticism and reflection
- scepticism and objectivity
- coherence and truth
- the instability of knowledge.
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