The division of Europe after World War II, 1946
著者
書誌事項
The division of Europe after World War II, 1946
（Ideas and action series, no. 2）
University of Texas Press, 1981
1st ed
- pbk.
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注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Should the negotiation of the post-World War II peace treaties in Europe have been pursued separately or should they have been approached within the framework of a general European settlement? The debate on this fundamental foreign policy issue, which has left only faint tracks in the documentary record, is fully explored here for the first time.
W. W. Rostow, in his second book in the Ideas and Action Series, describes a meeting that took place on the eve of the departure of Secretary of State James Byrnes for Paris to participate in treaty negotiations. The meeting was probably the only occasion during 1946 when the peace treaty issue as a whole was explicitly addressed at a high level with lucid alternatives on the table. The plan laid before Secretary of State Byrnes by his senior subordinates, Under Secretary Dean Acheson and Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs Will Clayton, aimed to halt the movement toward the split of Europe and the emergence of hostile blocs. It outlined an all-European settlement, including economic and security institutions linked to the United Nations. Only one part of the proposal gained Byrnes's support and came to life: the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe in Geneva. But the Acheson-Clayton proposal foreshadowed the Marshall Plan.
The book's larger theme is the process by which the Cold War came about. Rostow's interpretation differs from either conventional or revisionist views, emphasizing as it does the process of incremental deterioration that occurred in 1946 and the role of uncertainty and weakness in American policy.
This second volume in the Ideas and Action Series will interest general readers as well as those with a particular interest in World War II. It should be of special value to political scientists, economists, military historians, and policy makers, and may serve as a case study in a variety of courses.
目次
Preface
1. The Issue and the Decision
2. The Setting: 1946, a "Disastrous Year"
3. The Foreign Service Outlook on the Prospects for Europe
4. How the Acheson-Clayton Plan Came to Be Formulated
5. The ECE, the Crisis of 1947, and the Marshall Plan
6. A Few Reflections
Appendixes
A. Three Versions of the Proposal for an All-European Settlement
B. Three Press Reports on the Proposal, April 24-25, 1946
C. Telegrams of May 9, 1946, from Acheson and Hilldring to Byrnes in Paris, Referring to the Plan
D. George Kennan's "Practical Deductions" from the Analysis in His "Long Cable" of February 1946
E. Rostow to Kindleberger Memorandum of June 10, 1946, Reporting on His Trip to Berlin and Paris
E Churchill's Zurich Speech of September 19, 1946, in Support of European Unity
G. John Foster Dulles' Speech ofJanuary 17, 1947, in Support of European Unity
H. Memorandum of March 26, 1946, by a Member of EUR, David Harris, Arguing for U.S. Support for German Unity
Notes
Index
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