Research in experimental economics : a research annual

Author(s)

• Smith, Vernon L.
• Isaac, R. Mark

Bibliographic Information

Research in experimental economics : a research annual

editor, Vernon L. Smith

JAI Press, c1979-

• v. 1 : 1979
• v. 2 : 1982
• v. 3 : 1985
• v. 4 : 1991
• v. 5 : 1992
• v. 6 : 1996
• v. 8 : 2001

Other Title

Research in experimental economics

Note

v. 4- :editor, R. Mark Isaac

Publisher varies: Emerald

Supplement 1 with special title

Description and Table of Contents

Volume

v. 8 : 2001 ISBN 9780762307029

Description

Volume 8 of "Research in Experimental Economics" provides a forum for papers incorporating laboratory experimental economics. These specifically include interdisciplinary papers, papers that report experimental design innovations and papers that report detailed data. The paper by Isaac, Walker and Williams is an example. It discusses the design of instructional experiments in such areas as monopoly, asset trading double auctions, and public goods. The paper also examines practical issues of using laboratory experiments as a teaching tool. Four papers report on public goods research. Krishnamurthy, motivated by research questions in Marketing, examines the role of non-binding, face-to-face communication in public goods environments with and without provision points. Chewning, Coller, and Laury incorporate a natural modification of previous provision-point environments, namely, multiple provision points in which additional amounts of the public good will be provided at increasing threshold steps. The paper by Packard, Isaac, and Bial extends research on the marginal per capita return effect (broken down between the MPCR affecting own payoff and affecting others). This paper takes that distinction to a boundary in which the public good provides no marginal per capita return to the contributor. The paper by Croson examines, in the light of the literature on team production, the effect in a public goods environment of different levels of feedback on others' contributions. In one treatment, individuals know only the aggregate contributions of others, while in the other treatment they had information on individual decisions. The paper by Kelly extends existing research regarding single sellers by providing for multiproduct monopolists. It is not merely the addition of additional products that distinguishes this paper, but also the fact that monopolists have a bundling decision to make. This volume concludes with two papers that use controlled experiments for testing policy-relevant allocation mechanisms. Elliott, Kruse, Schulze, and Ben-David examine four mechanisms for the rationing of productive inputs that are subject to supply shocks. Electricity markets are one obvious motivation, but certainly not the only one. Ishikida, Ledyard, Olson, and Porter present experimental "testbedding" research on the California RECLAIM emissions permit market.

Table of Contents

List of contributors. Preface. Experimental economics methods in the large undergraduate classroom: practical considerations (R.M. Isaac, J.M. Walker and A.W. Williams). Communication effects in public good games with and without provision points (S. Krishnamurthy). Voluntary contributions to a multiple threshold public good (E.G. Chewning, M. Coller and S.K. Laury). Feedback in voluntary contribution mechanisms: an experiment in team production (R.T.A. Croson). Asymmetric benefits in the voluntary contribution mechanism: a boundary experiment (D. Packard, R.M. Isaac and J. Bial). Search behavior of the multiproduct monopolist: experimental results (F.S. Kelly). Rationing supply capacity shocks: a laboratory comparison of second best mechanisms (S.R. Elliott, J. Brown Kruse, W. Schulze and S. Ben-David). Experimental test bedding of a pollution trading system: southern California's reclaim emissions market (T. Ishikida, J. Ledyard, M. Olson and D. Porter).

Volume

v. 5 : 1992 ISBN 9781559383660

Description

Part of a series which offers an insight into research in experimental economics, this volume discusses such topics as testing non-cooperative bargaining theory in experiments; incentive regulation; and the calculation of mixed strategies in posted-offer auctions; among other topics.

Table of Contents

• Preface, R. Mark Isaac
• moral hazard and risk sharing experimental evidence, Joyce E. Berg et al
• testing principal-agent theory, Seth Epstein
• do prices convey information? further empirical evidence, Douglas V. DeJong et al
• private information, prices, asset allocation, and profits - further experimental evidence, Susan Watts
• forward induction - experimental evidence from two-stage games with complete information, Jordi Brandts and Charles A. Holt
• testing non-cooperative bargaining theory in experiments, Glenn W. Harrison and Kevin A. McCabe
• incentive regulation and regulation, James C. Cox and R. Mark Isaac
• the calculation of equilibrium mixed strategies in posted-offer auctions, Charles A. Holt and Fernando Solis-Soberon.

by "Nielsen BookData"

Details

• NCID: BA18542222
• ISBN:
  • 0892320303
  • 0892322632
  • 089232337X
  • 0892326522
  • 1559383666
  • 155938607X
  • 0762307021
• Country Code: us
• Title Language Code: eng
• Text Language Code: eng
• Place of Publication: Greenwich, Conn.
• Pages/Volumes: v.
• Size: 24 cm