War and reason : domestic and international imperatives
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
War and reason : domestic and international imperatives
Yale University Press, c1992
- : hbk
- : pbk
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Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 307-314) and index
Description and Table of Contents
- Volume
-
: hbk ISBN 9780300052022
Description
Working in the rational choice tradition of economics, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman have written a work about foreign policy choices and their implications for a wide variety of events, including, but not limited to, war and peace. The book sheds light on a number of the most important questions in international relations. It contains over 25 propositions about the necessary and sufficient conditions for war, negotiations, status quo, capitulation, and acquiescence as outcomes of disputes. It addresses questions pertaining to norms that induce co-operation, as well as to conventional realist arguments about power and war. The authors pose five empirical puzzles about democracies (e.g., the absence of wars between democracies) and suggest deductively derived answers to each. The work addresss questions of co-operation and conflict; of full information and incomplete information; of deductive logic and empirical evidence. The results should be of great importance not just for theorists, but for practitioners as well.
Table of Contents
- Part 1 A game of international interactions: goals and purpose of the study
- the game of international interactions
- governmental decisions when war is possible. Part 2 Domestic constraints and foreign policy: co-operation - norms, beliefs and international interactions
- domestic constraints and democratic puzzles. Part 3 Power, international interactions and war: power relationships, international interactions and war
- seven weeks to system transformation - is big war a prerequisite of system change?. Part 4 Foreign policy implications of the international interaction game: policy speculation for the post-cold war world
- with reason, but perhaps contrary to the general interest.
- Volume
-
: pbk ISBN 9780300059229
Description
In this landmark work, two leading theorists of international relations analyze the strategies designed to avoid international conflict. Using a combination of game theory, statistical analysis, and detailed case histories, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman evaluate the conditions that promote negotiation, the status quo, capitulation, acquiescence, and war.
The authors assess two competing theories on the role that domestic politics plays in foreign policy choices: one states that national decision makers are constrained only by the exigencies of the international system, and the other views leaders as additionally constrained by domestic political considerations. Finding the second theory to be more consistent with historical events, they use it to examine enduring puzzles such as why democracies do not appear to fight one another, whether balance of power or power preponderance promotes peaceful resolution of disputes, and what conditions are necessary and sufficient for nations to cooperate with one another. They conclude by speculating about the implications of their theory for foreign policy strategies in the post-Cold War world.
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