The question of free will : a holistic view
著者
書誌事項
The question of free will : a holistic view
Princeton University Press, c1993
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注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
One of the main philosophical puzzles is the question of free will: what is it? do we have it? how do we know we have it? In this highly original study, noted philosopher Morton White offers a novel defense of the position that we may believe in free will without denying or accepting determinism. White is especially concerned to interpret the statement that a person is free to choose to do something. If it means that not making the choice is not causally necessitated, the question arises: "Not causally necessitated by what?" Antideterminists answer: "Not causally necessitated by anything," whereas those who avoid antideterminism may answer: "Not causally necessitated by an attack of mental disease or by hypnosis." In evaluating these opposing views, White appeals to holism, which says that we do not test isolated statements but groups of statements. Moreover, he regards the statement that an obligatory choice must be free as a moral principle. With the help of these views, he shows how one's view of free choice varies with one's view of a moral excuse.
He also shows convincingly why anti-determinism should be rejected in favor of an opposing theory that organizes the relevant data in a simpler way without abandoning beliefs that many of us are reluctant to surrender.
目次
PrefaceCh. 1Some Preliminary Remarks31A Moral Principle Links "Ought" and "Can"32An Aside on the Analytic and the Synthetic53What Having Free Will Is74How We Know We Have Free Will9Ch. 2Moral Obligation and Freedom131"He Ought to Do A" Does Not Logically Imply "He Is Free to Do A" or "He Can Choose to Do A"132The Conjunction of "He Ought to Do A" with "He Is Not Free to Do A" or with "He Cannot Choose to Do A" Is Not Nonsensical203"Liberty...Is the Power a Man Has to Do or Forbear Doing", Locke26Ch. 3The Relativity of Freedom321Some Unsuccessful Efforts to Render Free Choice Compatible with Determinism322How Should We Interpret "Cicero Can Choose to Kill Caesar"?363A Moral Belief Determines What an Appropriate Precluder Is, and This Moral Belief May Vary from Person to Person464The Argument up to Now50Ch. 4Expansion, Analysis, and Free Choice531Expanding and Analyzing "Cicero Can Choose to Kill Caesar"552What Is an Appropriate Conditional Statement in the Analysis of "Cicero Can Kill Caesar"?63Ch. 5"He Can Do It", "He Will Do It if He Chooses", "He Can Do it if He Chooses", and "He Can Choose to Do It": Some Views about How They Are Related661"He Will if He Chooses" and "He Would Have if He Had Chosen" Are Causal Conditionals672"He Could Have Walked if He Had Chosen" and "He Would Have Walked if He Had Chosen": Their Relations with Each Other and with "He Could Have Walked"703Does "He Is Free to A" Logically Imply "He Can Choose to A"?764Remarks on Possible Opportunities795A Digression816Further Remarks on Possible Opportunities84Ch. 6Holism, Corporatism, and the Problem of Free Will881Holism and Corporatism892Two Rival Coniunctions943Comparing These Two Rivals1004The Problem of Ancestorial Determination107Ch. 7Concluding Remarks on Moral Belief and Free Will1181Two Questionable Inferences1182The Two Questionable Inferences Made by James1223A Remark on Aristotle1274In Reply to Certain Objections130Index of Proper Names137
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