Rules of encounter : designing conventions for automated negotiation among computers
著者
書誌事項
Rules of encounter : designing conventions for automated negotiation among computers
(Artificial intellignece)
MIT Press, 1994
大学図書館所蔵 全26件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Provides a unified, coherent account of machine interaction at the level of the machine designers (the society of designers) and the level of the machine interaction itself (the resulting artificial society).
Rules of Encounter applies the general approach and the mathematical tools of game theory in a formal analysis of rules (or protocols) governing the high-level behavior of interacting heterogeneous computer systems. It describes a theory of high-level protocol design that can be used to constrain manipulation and harness the potential of automated negotiation and coordination strategies to attain more effective interaction among machines that have been programmed by different entities to pursue different goals. While game theoretic ideas have been used to answer the question of how a computer should be programmed to act in a given specific interaction, here they are used in a new way, to address the question of how to design the rules of interaction themselves for automated agents. Rules of Encounter provides a unified, coherent account of machine interaction at the level of the machine designers (the society of designers) and the level of the machine interaction itself (the resulting artificial society). Taking into account such attributes of the artificial society as efficiency, and the self-interest of each member in the society of designers, it analyzes what kinds of rules should be instituted to govern interaction among these autonomous agents. The authors point out that adjusting the rules of public behavior-or the rules of the game-by which the programs must interact can influence the private strategies that designers set up in their machines, shaping design choices and run-time behavior, as well as social behavior. Artificial Intelligence series
目次
- Part 1 Machines that make deals: the premise
- machine encounters
- social engineering for machines
- scenarios
- how does this differ from Al?
- how does this differ from game theory? Part 2 Interaction mechanisms: the negotiation problem in different domains
- attributes of negotiation mechanisms
- assumptions
- incentive compatibility. Part 3 Task-oriented domains: domain definition
- attributes and examples
- a negotiation mechanism
- evaluation of the negotiation mechanism
- an alternative, one-step protocol
- mechanisms that maximize the product of utilities
- the bottom line. Part 4 Deception-free protocols: non-manipulable negotiation mechanisms
- probabilistic deals
- subadditive domains
- concave domains
- modular domains
- summary of incentive compatible mechanisms
- the bottom line. Part 5 State-oriented domains: side-effects in encounters
- domain definition
- attributes and examples
- a negotiation mechanism
- worth of a goal
- conflict resolution
- semi-co-operative deals in non-conflict situations
- unified negotiation protocols (UNP)
- multi-plan deals
- the hierarchy of deal types - summary
- unbounded worth of a goal - tidy agents
- the bottom line. Part 6 Strategic manipulation: negotiation with incomplete information
- incomplete information about worth of goals
- using the revelation principle to re-design the mechanisms
- the bottom line. Part 7 Worth-oriented domains: goal relaxation
- domain definition
- one agent best plan
- negotiation over sub-optimal states
- examples of worth functions
- the bottom line. Appendices: strict/tolerant mechanisms
- some related work
- proofs.
「Nielsen BookData」 より