書誌事項

A course in game theory

Martin J. Osborne, Ariel Rubinstein

MIT Press, c1994

  • : hard
  • : pbk

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注記

Bibliography: p. [321]-339

Includes index

内容説明・目次

巻冊次

: hard ISBN 9780262150415

内容説明

This text presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.

目次

  • Part 1 Introduction: game theory
  • games and solutions
  • game theory and the theory of competitive equilibrium
  • rational behaviour
  • the steady state and deductive interpretations
  • bounded rationality
  • terminology and notation. Part 2 Strategic games: Nash equilibrium
  • mixed, correlated, and evolutionary equilibrium
  • rationalizability and iterated elimination of dominated actions
  • knowledge and equilibrium. Part 3 Extensive games with perfect information: extensive games with perfect information
  • bargaining games
  • repeated games
  • complexity considerations in repeated games
  • implementation theory. Part 4 Extensive games with imperfect information: extensive games with imperfect information
  • sequential equilibrium. Part 5 Coalitional games: the core
  • stable sets, the bargaining set, and the Shapley value
  • the Nash solution.
巻冊次

: pbk ISBN 9780262650403

内容説明

A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.

目次

  • Part 1 Introduction: game theory
  • games and solutions
  • game theory and the theory of competitive equilibrium
  • rational behaviour
  • the steady state and deductive interpretations
  • bounded rationality
  • terminology and notation. Part 2 Strategic games: Nash equilibrium
  • mixed, correlated, and evolutionary equilibrium
  • rationalizability and iterated elimination of dominated actions
  • knowledge and equilibrium. Part 3 Extensive games with perfect information: extensive games with perfect information
  • bargaining games
  • repeated games
  • complexity considerations in repeated games
  • implementation theory. Part 4 Extensive games with imperfect information: extensive games with imperfect information
  • sequential equilibrium. Part 5 Coalitional games: the core
  • stable sets, the bargaining set, and the Shapley value
  • the Nash solution.

「Nielsen BookData」 より

詳細情報

  • NII書誌ID(NCID)
    BA23229820
  • ISBN
    • 0262150417
    • 9780262650403
  • LCCN
    94008308
  • 出版国コード
    us
  • タイトル言語コード
    eng
  • 本文言語コード
    eng
  • 出版地
    Cambridge, Mass.
  • ページ数/冊数
    xv, 352 p.
  • 大きさ
    23 cm
  • 分類
  • 件名
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