Desire : its role in practical reason and the explanation of action
著者
書誌事項
Desire : its role in practical reason and the explanation of action
（Bradford book）
MIT Press, 1995
- : pb
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. [217]-218) and index
内容説明・目次
- 巻冊次
-
ISBN 9780262193559
内容説明
Does action always arise out of desire? G.F. Schueler examines this hotly debated topic in philosophy of action and moral philosophy, arguing that once two senses of "desire" are distinguished -- roughly, genuine desires and pro attitudes -- apparently plausible explanations of action in terms of the agent's desires can be seen to be mistaken. Desire probes a fundamental issue in philosophy of mind, the nature of desires and how, if at all, they motivate and justify our actions. At least since Hume argued that reason "is and of right ought to be the slave of the passions," many philosophers have held that desires play an essential role both in practical reason and in the explanation of intentional action. G.F. Schueler looks at contemporary accounts of both roles in various belief-desire models of reasons and explanation and argues that the usual belief-desire accounts need to be replaced. Schueler contends that the plausibility of the standard belief-desire accounts rests largely on a failure to distinguish "desires proper," like a craving for sushi, from so-called "pro attitudes," which may take the form of beliefs and other cognitive states as well as desires proper.
Schueler's "deliberative model" of practical reasoning suggests a different view of the place of desire in practical reason and the explanation of action. He holds that we can arrive at an intention to act by weighing the relevant considerations and that these may not include desires proper at all. A Bradford Book
目次
- Part 1 What are desires?: some examples of desire
- Nagel's "motivated" and "unmotivated" desires
- two senses of "desire"
- Platt's taxonomy of desires. Part 2 Desires as justifying reasons - part 1, internal reasons: internal reasons and the desire/belief model of agents' reasons
- the distinction between justifying and explaining reasons
- Williams's argument against distinguishing justifying and explaining reasons. Part 3 Desires as justifying reasons - part 2, reason-providing desires and the practical syllogism: Schiffer's "reason-providing desires"
- are "reason-providing desires really reason-providing?
- the practical syllogism
- the role of desires proper in practical reason. Part 4 Desires in the explanation of actions - part 1, desires as causes of actions: Goldman's analysis of desire/belief explanations
- Dretske's account of belief
- Dretske's causal analysis of desire/belief explanations
- the reward thesis
- the problem of multiple motives. Part 5 Desires in the explanation of actions - part 2, intentional-stance explanations and background desires: Dennett's "intentional stance" explanations
- pro attitudes cannot be elements of deliberation
- "background" and "foreground" desires
- why it is easy to conflate pro attitudes and desires proper. Part 6 Two models of desire/belief explanation: impulse versus deliberation
- direct and reflective desire/belief explanations
- evaluating the three models
- the need for two models of desire/belief explanation.
- 巻冊次
-
: pb ISBN 9780262528573
内容説明
Does action always arise out of desire? G.F. Schueler examines this hotly debated topic in philosophy of action and moral philosophy, arguing that once two senses of "desire" are distinguished-roughly, genuine desires and pro attitudes-apparently plausible explanations of action in terms of the agent's desires can be seen to be mistaken.
Does action always arise out of desire? G.F. Schueler examines this hotly debated topic in philosophy of action and moral philosophy, arguing that once two senses of "desire" are distinguished-roughly, genuine desires and pro attitudes-apparently plausible explanations of action in terms of the agent's desires can be seen to be mistaken.
Desire probes a fundamental issue in philosophy of mind, the nature of desires and how, if at all, they motivate and justify our actions. At least since Hume argued that reason "is and of right ought to be the slave of the passions," many philosophers have held that desires play an essential role both in practical reason and in the explanation of intentional action. G.F. Schueler looks at contemporary accounts of both roles in various belief-desire models of reasons and explanation and argues that the usual belief-desire accounts need to be replaced.
Schueler contends that the plausibility of the standard belief-desire accounts rests largely on a failure to distinguish "desires proper," like a craving for sushi, from so-called "pro attitudes," which may take the form of beliefs and other cognitive states as well as desires proper. Schueler's "deliberative model" of practical reasoning suggests a different view of the place of desire in practical reason and the explanation of action. He holds that we can arrive at an intention to act by weighing the relevant considerations and that these may not include desires proper at all.
A Bradford Book
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